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Section 1: Introduction
2
 
Fish is a major source of protein for a large portion of the world’s population. Even though 
fish is a renewable resource, it is not imperishable. Fishery resources around the world are 
threatened by overexploitation and a host of other factors (Kahn, 2005,376). 
More than 75% of the global fish produce is used for direct human consumption.
3
 Fish that is 
not utilized for direct human consumption is used as an input in the global value chain for the 
production of other goods. For example, fish is used as an input for fishmeal and animal feed 
for livestock. Further, the bi-product from fish is used to produce fish oil, which is a rich 
source of omega-3.  
The global market for fishmeal & fish oil is projected to reach a value of USD 14.28 billion 
by 2022.
4
 The growing trade in fishmeal & fish oil can be attributed to the increasing demand 
for aquaculture and quality fish in the export markets. On the basis of industrial application, 
statistics for the year 2016 reveal that fishmeal & fish oil were most widely consumed in the 
pharmaceutical industry, for the production of Omega-3 fatty acids and antibiotics, 
respectively. 
The fisheries sector is vital for the economic development of developing states. According to 
the 2016 FAO Report on the State of the World of Fisheries and Aquaculture, both “fisheries 
and aquaculture remain an important source of food, nutrition, income and livelihoods for 
hundreds of millions around the world”. The report also shows that in 2016 the developing 
countries accounted for more than half of the fish exports. In other words, the developing 
countries hold a greater share of the fisheries market as compared to the developed 
economies. As a result, for developing and least developed countries, fish is not just used for 
human consumption but also adds to the upstream and downstream values. 
Emerging landlocked developing countries, that are exporters of pharmaceutical products, 
including generics of fish oil, use fish as a raw material for the production of medicines. The 
disciplines on fisheries subsidies being negotiated at the WTO will affect the price of and 
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access to fish. This will have an impact on the landlocked economies that use fish as a raw 
material for medicinal purposes.  
Under the current round of negotiations, the WTO members have been steadfast in their 
resolve to obtain an outcome on disciplines in relation to fisheries subsidies. As countries are 
preparing for the 11
th
 WTO Ministerial Conference (MC11) in Argentina in December, 
negotiations have intensified. 
The scheme of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will discuss fisheries resource management 
in view of the existing legal instruments and the role of the Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations (hereinafter RFMO). Further, this section will briefly discuss the existing 
mandates on fisheries subsidies negotiations including the Doha and Hong Kong declarations. 
Section 3 of the paper will examine the current fisheries subsidies proposals and their 
implications for developing countries. Section 4 will delve into fisheries subsidies disciplines 
and its inextricable link to market access as opposed to sustainability. The following Section 
5, based on the assessments from Sections 2 and 4, will discuss the implications of the WTO 
subsidies negotiations and the asymmetrical outcomes for developing countries. Finally, 
Section 6 ends with a conclusion. 
 
Section 2: Fisheries Resource Management and Existing Fisheries Instruments 
This section is divided into five subsections. Section 2.1 discusses the definitions and extent 
of the maritime boundaries, as stipulated under the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, 1982. Section 2.2 explains the provisions on fisheries management under legally 
binding international instruments. Section 2.3 elaborates the role of RFMOs with respect to 
fisheries management. Section 2.4 provides an overview of the non-binding international 
instruments in relation to fisheries. Finally, Section 2.5 discusses the subsidies obligations 
entailed under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
Section 2.1: Maritime Boundaries under the UNCLOS 
At the outset, it is important to understand the demarcation of the ocean area and the 
ownership and control that coastal States can exercise. The borders of the sea/ocean are 
known as maritime boundaries. The United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, 1982 
(hereinafter UNCLOS) has specified seven maritime boundaries. These are the internal 
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waters, territorial waters, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (hereinafter EEZ), high 
seas, continental shelf and international seabed (Hall S,2014, 655). 
The internal waters comprise waters lying on the landward side of the baseline of the 
territorial sea.
5
 Under the UNCLOS, States have a sovereign right over their internal waters 
and can therefore regulate access to their ports (Hall S, 2014, 664). 
The territorial waters or national sea is the belt of water adjacent to the land territory of a 
coastal State, over which the coastal State has sovereign rights. The UNCLOS allows 
Member States to establish the breadth of the territorial sea to a limit not exceeding 12 
nautical miles as measured from the baselines.
6
  The convention clarifies that the 
“sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters…to an 
adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea”.7 States accordingly enjoy, in principle, 
all the rights of sovereignty over their territorial sea, including foreign vessels and persons 
located therein, that they enjoy in their land territory and internal waters. This sovereignty 
extends to the airspace above and subsoil beneath the territorial sea. (Hill, 2014, 666). 
The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea which shall not extend beyond 
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured. As per Article 56(1)(a) UNCLOS, within the EEZ the coastal State has 
“(s)overeign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the 
natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superajacent to the seabed and 
of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation 
and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and 
winds”. In other words, a coastal State has the right to harvest fish and any other marine 
creatures and to prospect for and exploit any oil and mineral lying beneath or on the seabed. 
This also includes fish resources within the EEZ. Given that the right to engage in these 
activities is sovereign, the coastal State may exclude any person and any other State from 
pursuing activities, or permit activities of such persons, on such terms as the coastal State 
decides.  
The high sea consists of an ocean area which lies beyond the internal waters, territorial sea, 
EEZ and archipelagic waters of coastal States. It represents about 64% of the world’s marine 
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surface and 45% of the entire surface of the world (Hill, 2014, 686). The high sea is beyond 
the jurisdiction of any State. Under UNCLOS I (1958), the freedom of the high seas included 
the freedom of fishing, laying submarine cables and pipelines and the freedom of over flight. 
UNCLOS III (1982), added to this list the construction of artificial islands and other 
installations permitted by international law and the freedom to conduct scientific research. 
In addition to stipulating the broad maritime zones, the UNLOS has laid down the legal 
framework for marine resource management. The following sub-section examines the extant 
legal instruments and the role of the RFMOs in fisheries management. The subsection argues 
against the adoption of stringent fisheries management obligations as part of the disciplines 
on fisheries subsidies at the WTO.  
Section 2.2: Legally Binding International Instruments in Marine Resource 
Management 
In the current negotiations on fisheries subsidies at the WTO, the proposals forwarded by the 
EU (TN/RL/GEN/181) and Indonesia (TN/RL/GEN/189) have made strong linkages to 
management measures as a condition for the special and differential treatment for developing 
countries. For other major developing countries the argument has been that fisheries 
management issues should not be part of the disciplines on fisheries subsidies. This is evident 
in the ACP proposal (TN/RL/GEN/192) that focuses on the core role of the WTO as a trade 
organization and its mandate on trade. The onerous legal obligations viz. fisheries resource 
management under the existing Multilateral Environmental Agreements must not be 
transposed into binding obligations under the WTO.   In other words, fisheries management 
measures need to be outside the purview of the WTO. 
At present, there are two major legally binding Multilateral Environmental Agreements that 
deal with fisheries resource management within the EEZ and the high seas – the UNCLOS 
and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (1995). Given this context, it is essential to discuss the 
existing international legal instruments relevant for fisheries resource management.  
a) UNCLOS  
Under the UNCLOS, Member States have the sovereign right to explore, exploit, conserve 
and manage the fisheries in their EEZ. Most developing countries that are coastal states, must 
exercise caution in the fisheries negotiations - by particularly ensuring that their obligations 
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with regard to fisheries management must not compromise their sovereign rights as enshrined 
under the UNCLOS.  
Article 61, UNCLOS of the “Conservation of Living Resources” states that “the coastal state, 
taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it, shall ensure through proper 
conservation and management measures that  maintenance of living resources in the 
exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation. As appropriate, the coastal 
state and competent international organizations, whether subregional, regional or global are 
required to cooperate”. It further states that “ such measures shall also be designed to 
maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the 
maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, 
including the economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements of 
developing states…”. 
 
In practice, the management of resources within the EEZ is conducted through the 
formulation and development of national fisheries legislations and policies. In doing so, 
various economic, social and environmental factors are given due regard. Member States 
cooperate with regional or sub-regional agencies that assist them through the training of 
observers and providing scientific advice. On the basis of the said scientific advice, States 
develop national regulations for issuing licenses or permits to the local and foreign vessels for 
fishing in their EEZ.  
Sub-regional systems of collaboration are present in different regions. For example, in the 
Pacific region, the regulation of fisheries in the EEZ is achieved through the assistance of 
sub-regional organizations such as the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), the South Pacific 
Community (SPC) and the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA for per seine fisheries). The 
coastal states within a certain region are members of these sub-regional organizations. These 
organizations have the skills and expertise to provide management advice to the coastal 
States.  
The FFA was established to assist coastal States to sustainably manage the fisheries resources 
within their EEZ. The FFA provides advisory and technical assistance as well as other 
support to its members, viz. formulating national regulations on their tuna resources. Member 
States also participate in regional decision making in tuna management through agencies such 
as the Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. The FFA provides advice on 1) 
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fisheries development which includes the development of capacity of members to sustainably 
harvest, process and market tuna to create livelihood, 2) fisheries management which 
provides policy and legal frameworks for sustainable management of tuna and 3) fisheries 
operations by supporting monitoring, control and surveillance of fisheries as well as treaty 
administration, information technology, vessel registration and monitoring.
8
 The members of 
FFA include Australia, Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. 
The Pacific Community (SPC) within the Pacific region was established in 1947 and its 
principle role is to provide scientific and technical advice in the Pacific region. The SPC also 
provides scientific advice to member countries in relation to fisheries.  The SPC’s Oceanic 
Fisheries Programme serves as the Western Central Pacific Commissions (WCPFC) Science 
Services Provider and Data Manager.
9
 This relationship ensures that there is no duplication of 
effort in the area of collection and processing of scientific data on fishing activities in the 
region. The member countries of the SPC include, USA, Australia, New Zealand, American 
Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, French 
Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Northern Mariana Islands, Papua New 
Guinea, Pitacain Island, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Wallis and 
Futuna.
10
 
The PNA controls the world’s largest sustainable tuna purse seine fishery. Many of the PNA 
measures are the first in the world and these include high sea closures to fishing, controls on 
fish aggregate devices (FADs), protection of whale sharks and 100% coverage of per seine 
fishing vessels with observers.  The focus on PNA efforts to sustainably manage tuna is the 
vessel day scheme. The PNA members agree on a limited number of fishing days for the year 
based on scientific advice about the status of the tuna stock. Fishing days are then allocated 
by country and sold to the highest bidder. The PNA members include Federated States of 
Micronesia, Kiribati, Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands and Tuvalu.
11
  
In relation to the management of the high seas, Article 118 of the UNCLOS stipulates that 
“States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living 
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resources in the areas of the high seas. States, whose nationals exploit identical living 
resources or different living resources in the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a 
view to taking the measure necessary for conservation of the living resources concerned. 
They shall as appropriate, cooperate to establish sub-regional or regional fisheries 
organizations to this end.” This cooperation has resulted in the establishment of RFMOs. 
 
b) UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
 
The UNCLOS is complemented by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (hereinafter UNFSA). 
The UNFSA’s objective is to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory stocks through effective implementation. Article 5 
of the UNFSA states that in order to conserve and manage straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks, coastal states and states fishing on the high seas shall, in giving effect 
to their duty to cooperate in accordance with the convention to “(a) adopt measures to ensure 
long-term sustainability of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and 
promote the objective of their optimum utilization, (b) ensure that such measures are based 
on the best scientific evidence available and are designed to maintain or restore stocks at 
levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant 
environmental and economic factors, including the special requirements of developing states, 
and taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stock and any generally 
recommended international minimum standards, whether subregional, regional or global….h) 
take measures to prevent or eliminate overfishing capacity and to ensure that levels of fishing 
effort do not exceed those commensurate with the sustainable use of fishery resources…i) 
take into account the interest of artisanal and subsistence fisheries”. 
 
Part VII on the UN Fish Stock Agreement recognizes the special requirements of developing 
countries. It stipulates that States shall give full recognition to the special requirements of 
developing states in relation to conservation and management of straddling fish stocks. It 
states that “(i)n giving effect to the duty to cooperate in the establishment of conservation and 
management measures, States shall take into account the special requirements of developing 
states in particular (a) the vulnerability of developing states which are dependent on the 
exploitation of living marine resources, (b) the need to avoid adverse impact and ensure 
access to fisheries by subsistent, small scale and artisanal fisheries and (c) the need to ensure 
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that such measures do not result in transferring directly or indirectly, a disproportionate 
burden of conservation action into developing states”.12 
 
In the application of the management of the fisheries resources in the high seas, these are 
governed by a number of RFMOs. The participants of the RFMOs comprise the Members 
and Cooperating Non-Members. However, it is imperative to note that the Conservation and 
Management Measure so adopted must not impose a “disproportionate burden” on 
developing states.  
 
Section 2.3: Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 
a) The Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) 
In the Pacific region, the Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) is the 
established RFMO. The WCPFC was established by the Convention on the Management of 
Highly Migratory Fish Stock in the Western Central Pacific Ocean. The convention draws 
from the UNFSA and also takes into account the political, socio-economic, geographical and 
environmental characteristics of the Western Central Pacific Ocean region.  
The Convention establishes a governing body known as the Commission which comprises 
representatives from members, cooperating non-members and participating territories 
(collectively, CCMs). The Commission holds annual meetings and is presided over by a 
Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, who are elected from amongst the membership. The 
members of the WCPFC include Australia, China, Canada, Cook Islands, the European 
Union, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Republic of 
Korea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of 
America and Vanuatu. 
The WCPFC Convention seeks to address problems in the management of high seas fisheries 
resulting from unregulated fishing, over-capitalization, excessive fleet capacity, vessel re-
flagging to escape controls, insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases and insufficient 
multilateral cooperation in respect to conservation and management of highly migratory fish 
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stocks. Some other noteworthy features of the WCPFC are that it provides a framework for:  
(i) the participation of fishing entities in the Commission which legally binds fishing entities 
to the provisions of the Convention; (ii) the participation by territories and possessions in the 
work of the Commission; (iii) recognition of special requirements of developing States and 
(iv) cooperation with other RFMOs, whose respective areas of competence overlap with the 
WCPFC. The above features reflect the unique geo-political environment in which the 
Commission operates. The Commission provides support to three subsidiary bodies; the 
Scientific Committee, the Technical and Compliance Committee, and the Northern 
Committee.
13
   
The Scientific Committee (SC) meets in August and ensures that the Commission has the best 
available scientific information on which to consider appropriate conservation and 
management measures. The Scientific Committee utilizes the services of expert fisheries 
scientists and its meetings usually comprise scientific and other related technical 
representatives. The SC also coordinates with the Technical and Compliance Committee on 
certain matters to ensure consistent advice is provided to the Commission. 
The Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC) meets in October and is the “enforcement” 
committee of the Commission. The TCC reviews members’ adherence to Commission 
decisions and monitors individual countries’ implementation of those measures. The TCC 
also makes recommendations to the Commission with respect to encouraging, improving and 
enforcing compliance by members with the decisions of the Commission. 
The decisions of the Commission are taken by consensus. In cases where decisions have to be 
taken by vote, usually on substantive matters, a “two-chamber system” applies. The FFA 
members of the Commission comprise one chamber, while the non-FFA members form the 
other chamber. Decisions are taken by a three-fourths majority of those present and voting in 
each chamber and no proposal can be defeated by two or fewer votes in either chamber. 
To ensure compliance the WCPFC Convention mandates each member to establish and 
maintain a record of fishing vessels that are authorized to fish in the Convention Area, 
beyond that member’s area of national jurisdiction. The Secretariat maintains a central 
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database of each member’s authorized list of fishing vessels, which acts as a verification tool 
to ensure that fishing vessels are legally operating in the Convention Area. 
The WCPFC establishes a number of monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) 
programmes to ensure the Members’ compliance with conservation and management 
measures and other decisions of the Commission (such as in relation to requirements 
concerning data submission). One such programme is the Regional Observer Programme 
(ROP), which manages the placement of personnel on board fishing vessels to observe and 
collect data on fishing operations. Data collected by the observers is critical in assessing the 
effectiveness of measures, as well as providing scientists with important fishery independent 
information on the size and weight of the species taken. In addition, the role of an observer 
can be useful in ensuring compliance, through verification of fishing information such as 
vessel location, the time of year and species caught. 
Complementing the ROP is the Commission’s vessel monitoring system (VMS). Vessels 
fishing in the Convention Area are required to install a transmitting device known as an 
Automatic Location Communicator (ALC), which transmits a signal to a land-based 
receiving station where fisheries managers can view and track the location of the fishing 
vessels. This tool allows fisheries managers to better promote compliance with any area 
closures or restrictions that may be in place at any given time. It also helps scientists and 
managers understand the nature of fishing operations and where fishing is taking place. The 
Commission’s Vessel Monitoring Control became operational in April 2009. By the end of 
2009, over 2,000 vessels were reporting to the system. 
A third important monitoring, control and surveillance element is the boarding and inspection 
of fishing vessels on the high seas by patrol vessels registered with the Commission by 
CCMs. These patrol vessels conduct routine operations throughout the Pacific Ocean. Under 
an important measure adopted by the Commission, members have agreed to allow their 
fishing vessels to be boarded and inspected by the patrol vessels of other members. Patrol 
vessels provide the Commission with an important tool with which to monitor and in some 
situations, take action against, fishing violations on the high seas. 
Another critical component in the Commission’s compliance is the list of vessels that have 
engaged in Illegal, Unregulated or Unreported (IUU) activities. Vessels that have been found, 
through sufficient evidence, to have committed violations as described by the Commission, 
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are placed on what is known as an “IUU List”. Members are prohibited from engaging in 
fishing activities or other related transactions with vessels that are on the IUU List. This can 
act as a strong incentive for countries to closely monitor and regulate the activities of their 
fishing vessels. 
The WCPFC has concluded a number of Memoranda of Understandings (MOU) with related 
fisheries organizations, including the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), 
the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), the Indian Ocean 
Tuna Commission (IOTC) and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR). These MOUs help foster a close relationship between the 
WCPFC and these organizations and ensures that the lines of communication are open to 
discuss matters of common interest.
14
  
Table 1: Summary of CMM by WCPFC 
15
 
CMM Title Description 
2009-06 Regulation on 
Transshipment 
The provisions of this measure shall not apply to 
transshipment of highly migratory fish stocks where fish is 
taken and transshipped wholly in archipelagic waters or 
territorial seas. Transshipment in ports or in waters under 
national jurisdiction of a member shall take place in 
accordance with appropriate national laws. 
2009-10 To monitor landing 
of purse seine vessels 
at ports so as to 
ensure reliable catch 
data by species 
The Commission and the CCMs concerned shall work 
together to establish in 2010 an arrangement with a non-
CCM to enable collection of species and size and 
compensation data from canneries in non-CCMs regarding 
purse seine catch in the convention area. Data obtained 
under the CMM shall be handled in non-public domain. 
(Retain confidentiality of catch data) 
2010-06 A list of vessels 
presumed to have 
The CMM defines what may constitute IUU, the 
information regarding the alleged vessel, the draft IUU list, 
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carried out IUU provisional and current vessel list of IUU, modification of 
vessel list including the removal of vessels. 
2013-06 Criteria for 
developing 
Conservation and 
Management 
Measures 
States that the CMMS must not result in transferring 
directly or indirectly a disproportionate burden of 
conservation action on small States. As such the new 
proposal on CMMs to be assessed against set criteria. In 
cases where transfer of disproportionate burden of 
conservation is present, this needs to be mitigated by 
phased or delayed implementation, exemption from 
specific obligations, proportional or rotational 
implementation and the establishment of compensatory 
funds. 
2013-07 Special Requirements 
of Small Island 
Developing States 
These includes capacity development including training, 
institutional support, technical training on data collection, 
scientific research, stock assessment, by-catch mitigation, 
fisheries science and administration. Assistance provided 
for Monitoring, Control and Surveillance, technology 
transfer, support for domestic fisheries sector including 
ensuring that SIDS and territories account for 50% of total 
catch and value of highly migratory fish stocks by 
encouraging investment and collaborative arrangement 
with SIDS. The action to not constraint coastal processing 
and use of transshipment facilities and associated vessels of 
SIDS to undermine legitimate investment in SIDS. The 
CCMs shall take action to eliminate barriers to trade in fish 
and fisheries products and promote activities of domestic 
fisheries sector and fisheries related businesses in SIDS 
and territories. 
 
b) International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas16(ICCAT) 
The ICCAT is responsible for the conservation of tuna and tuna-like species in the Atlantic 
Ocean and adjacent seas. The organization was established at a Conference of 
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Plenipotentiaries, which prepared and adopted the International Convention for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas signed in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1966. After a ratification 
process, the Convention entered formally into force in 1969.  The Commission's work 
requires the collection and analysis of statistical information relative to current conditions and 
trends of the fishery resources in the Convention. About 30 species are covered by the 
Convention: Atlantic Bluefin.  
The Commission is composed of Contracting Parties. The Commission may be joined by any 
government that is a member of the United Nations, any specialized UN agency, or any inter-
governmental economic integration organization constituted by States that have transferred to 
it competence over the matters governed by the ICCAT Convention.  There are 51 
contracting parties to ICCAT. Some of which are the USA, Japan, South Africa, Ghana, 
Canada, France, Brazil, Korea, Cote D Ivoire, Angola, Russia, Gabon, Venezuela, Panama, 
China, United Kingdom, Namibia, Vanuatu, Guatemala, Elsalvado and Honduras. 
The Commission has also created a special status known as Cooperating Non-Contracting 
Party, Entity or Fishing Entity. Parties, entities or fishing entities that are granted this status 
have many of the same obligations, and are entitled to many of the same privileges, as are 
Contracting Parties. 
The ICCAT has two standing committees: (1) Administration and Finance and (2) Research 
and Statistics. The Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) recommends to 
the Commission all policy and procedures for the collection, compilation, analysis and 
dissemination of fishery statistics. The SCRS is entrusted with ensuring that the Commission 
has available at all times complete and current statistics concerning fishing activities in the 
Convention Area as well as biological information on the stocks that are fished. The 
Committee also coordinates various national research activities, develops plans for special 
international cooperative research programs, carries out stock assessments, and advises the 
Commission on the need for specific Conservation and Management Measures. The SCRS is 
composed of other subsidiary bodies that examine different species or different topics. These 
include the Species Groups (working groups that assess the status of the various stocks), and 
two Sub-Committees: Statistics and Ecosystems.  
These types of fishery-dependent data are mandatory according to the ICCAT Convention 
and to various international agreements. The most basic data type that must be collected and 
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reported to the ICCAT is total annual catch by species, flag, stock area and gear. Other types 
of data such as catch/effort samples and size samples also need to be collected and reported to 
the ICCAT.  Some of the specific types of data required by ICCAT is as follows: 
a)  Data on Nominal Catches: Nominal catch estimates (targeted and by-catch species) 
and dead discards, classified by fishing fleet, species, year, gear, region, fishing 
waters (EEZ or high seas). Task I should include all catches, including recreational 
fisheries and those of research and training vessels of all tuna and tuna-like species 
and sharks, whether taken as target species or by-catch. Where fish are fattened in fish 
farms, Task I statistics should include the weight of the fish at the time of their 
capture. Where fish farm products are exported, the weight of fattened fish exported 
should be reported separately.  
b) Data on Catch & Effort: Catch (species catch composition) and effort statistics, 
classified by fishing fleet, gear, time strata and area strata, in accordance with the 
ICCAT coding system currently under development. This data may be estimates 
(always raised to the total catches) and/or observed data obtained through various data 
sources (log-books, auction sales, port sampling, landing ports, transshipments etc).  
c) Size samples: Size frequencies of the samples measured for each species classified by 
fishing fleet, species, gear, sample units, time strata, area strata. • Task II catch-at-
size: Reported catch-at-size estimates classified by fishing fleet, gear, time strata, and 
area strata for the major species (bluefin, albacore, yellowfin, bigeye, skipjack and 
swordfish) and by sex in the case of swordfish, 
Four Panels are responsible for keeping under review the species, group of species, or 
geographic area under its purview: Panel 1: Tropical Tunas (yellowfin, skipjack and bigeye); 
Panel 2: Northern Temperate Tunas (albacore and bluefin); Panel 3: Southern Temperate 
Tunas (albacore and southern bluefin); and, Panel 4: Other species (swordfish, billfishes, 
sharks). The Panels review scientific and other information and make recommendations for 
joint action by the Contracting Parties aimed at maintaining the stocks at levels that will 
permit maximum sustainable catches. The Panels may also recommend to the Commission 
studies and investigations necessary for obtaining information relating to its species, group of 
species, or geographic area, as well as the co-ordination of research programs by the 
Contracting Parties.  
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The compliance matters are reviewed by two different bodies: The Conservation and 
Management Measures Compliance Committee (reviews matters related to Contracting 
Parties), and the Permanent Working Group on ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures 
(reviews matters related to Non-contracting Parties). The main sources of data for compliance 
are from logbooks, observer programs, port sampling, factory/market sampling, and 
international trade (import/export) statistics. In some cases, remote systems such as telephone 
and mail surveys are used. 
c) Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) 
The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission was established in 1993 through the Agreement 
Establishing the IOTC. There are 31 members of the IOTC. Some of the members are 
Australia, China, Comoros, EU, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, 
Phillipines, South Africa, United Kingdom, Mauritius, Thailand, Seychelles and Tanzania. 
The Cooperating Non Contracting Parties are Senegal, Bangladesh and Liberia.  
The sub-committees of the Commission include the Compliance Committee, the 
Administration and Finance and the Scientific Committee which provides scientific advice. 
Table 2: Summary of CMMs by the IOTC Commission.
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Resolution  Title Description  
Resolution 17/03 On establishing a list of 
vessels pressured to 
have carried out IUU 
The resolution provides definition of IUU 
fishing activities. The submission of 
information for IUU fishing activities, the 
drat IOTC IUU vessel lost, the provision of 
IOTC IUU vessels list, the action against 
IUU vessels, the vessel delisting procedures, 
the publication of IUU vessel list and change 
of details of vessels including IUU list. 
Resolution 17/06 On establishing a 
program for 
transshipment by large 
A program to monitor transshipment at sea 
applies only to large scale tuna long line 
fishing vessels. 
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scale fishing vessels. 
Resolution 16/02 On harvest control rules 
for skipjack tuna in the 
IOTC area of 
competence. 
One of the provisions states that stock shall 
be assessed every three years. 
Resolution 15/02 Mandatory statistical 
reporting requirements 
for IOTC contracting 
and non-contracting 
parties. 
Members to provide data on total catch by 
species and gear. The catch and effort data 
for the surface fishers, long line fishers and 
coastal fishers. 
Resolution 15/04 Concerning IOTC 
record of vessels 
authorized to operate in 
the IOTC Area of 
Compliance 
The Commission shall maintain an IOTC 
Record of fishing vessels that are: a) 24 meter 
in length and above and b) in case of vessels 
less than 24 meters, those operating in waters 
outside the EEZ of the flag state and 
authorized to fish tuna and tuna-like species. 
It further states that the provision shall not 
apply to vessels less than 24 m in length 
overall operating inside EEZ of the flag state. 
Resolution 10/10 Concerning Market 
Related Measures 
The CPC that imports tuna and tuna-like 
products from IOTC area or in whose ports 
those products are landed or transshipped 
should as much as possible collect and 
examine relevant data on imports, landing or 
transshipment. 
Resolution 03/01 On the limitation of 
fishing capacity of 
contracting parties and 
cooperating non-
contracting parties 
The Contracting Parties and Cooperating 
Non-contracting Parties (CPC) which have 
more than 50 vessels on the 2003 IOTC 
record of vessel shall limit in 2004 and 
following years the number of fishing vessels 
larger than 24 meters in length. The 
limitation number shall commensurate with 
the corresponding overall tonnage expressed 
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in Gross Registered Tonnage or in Gross 
Tonnage and where vessels are replaced the 
over tonnage shall not be exceeded. 
Resolution 99/02 Call for action against 
fishing activities by 
large scale flag of 
convenience (FOC) in 
long line vessels 
The CP and CNP of IOTC shall refuse 
landing and transshipment by the FOC 
vessels which are engaged in fishing 
activities diminishing the effectiveness of 
measures adopted by IOTC. The CP and CNP 
shall take every possible action consistent 
with their relevant laws and (i) urge their 
importers, transporters and other concerned 
business people to refrain from transacting in 
and transshipping tunas and tuna-like species 
caught by vessels carrying out FOC fishing 
activities; (ii) to inform their general public 
of FOC fishing activity by tuna long line 
vessels which diminish the effectiveness of 
IOTC CMM and urge them not to purchase 
fish harvested by such vessels and (iii) to 
urge their fish manufacturers and other 
concerned business people to prevent their 
vessels and equipment/devices from being 
used for FOC long-line fishing operators. 
 
Section 2.4: Non-Binding International Instruments in Relation to Fisheries 
Apart from the binding agreements of the UNCLOS and UN Fish stock agreement in the area 
of fisheries governance, countries have also developed other guidelines and policies to 
manage fisheries resources. These are guidelines are without legal effect and thus non-
binding on members. These include the following: 
1. FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing 
2. International Plan of Action (IPOA-IUU) 
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 International Plan of Action for reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline 
fishing 
 International Plan of Action for Conservation and Management Measures 
(CMMs) of Sharks 
 International Plan of Action for Fishing Capacity 
3. FAO Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Small Scale Fisheries 
4. FAO Agreement on Port State Measures 
 
a) FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fishing 
The FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fishing is a voluntary guideline. Article 2 of the 
guideline specifies the objectives of the code, which include inter alia to “establish 
principles, in accordance with the relevant rules of international law, for responsible fishing 
and fisheries activities, taking into account all their relevant biological, technological, 
economic, social, environmental and commercial aspects.” It further outlines the objective of 
“facilitating and promoting technical, financial and other cooperation in conservation of 
fisheries resources and fisheries management and development and the contribution of 
fisheries to food security”. The code also states in its objectives that the promotion and trade 
of fish and fishery products be in conformity with relevant international rules and avoid the 
use of measures that constitute a hidden barrier to trade. 
Article 5 of the FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fishing provides for the consideration 
of Special and Differential Treatment which is known as the special requirements of 
developing countries. It states that the capacity of developing countries to implement the 
recommendations of the code should be taken into account. In this relation, to support the 
effective implementation, countries, relevant international organizations, whether 
governmental or non-governmental and financial institutions should give full recognition to 
the special circumstances and requirements of developing countries, including in particular 
the least developed among them and Small Island Developing States. 
 
States, relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and financial 
institutions should work for the adoption of measures to address the needs of developing 
countries, especially in the areas of financial and technical assistance, technology transfer, 
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training and scientific cooperation and in enhancing their ability to develop their own 
fisheries as well as to participate in high seas fisheries, including access to fisheries. 
 
On the management of fisheries resources, Article 7 of the code states that “within areas 
under national jurisdiction, states should seek to identify relevant domestic parties having a 
legitimate interest in the use and management of fisheries resources and establish 
arrangements for consulting them to gain their collaboration in achieving responsible 
fisheries”. As regards trans boundary fish stocks, straddling fish stocks, highly migratory fish 
stocks and high seas fish stocks, where these are exploited by two or more states, the states 
concerned, including relevant coastal states in the case of straddling and highly migratory 
stocks, should cooperate to ensure effective conservation and management of the resources. 
This should be achieved, where appropriate, through the establishment of a bilateral, sub-
regional or regional fisheries organization or arrangement.  
 
The formation of a sub-regional or regional fisheries management organization or 
arrangement should include representatives of States within whose jurisdictions the resources 
occur, as well as representatives from States which have a real interest in the fisheries or the 
resources outside national jurisdictions. In instances where a subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or arrangement exists and has the competence to establish 
Conservation and Management Measures, those states should cooperate by becoming 
members of such organization or a participant in such arrangement and actively participate in 
its work. A state which is not a member of a subregional or regional fisheries management 
organization or is not a participant in a subregional or regional fisheries management 
arrangement should nevertheless cooperate, in accordance with relevant international 
agreements and international law, in the conservation and management of the relevant 
fisheries resources by giving effect to any conservation and management adopted by such 
organization or arrangements.  
 
The FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries further reinforces that the role of 
fisheries management is best suited under the competence of the regional and sub-regional 
organizations that are in existence. It further recognizes the Special and Differential 
Treatment that has to be accorded to developing states in relation to fisheries management 
and elaborates on such assistance including technical, financial and technology transfers. 
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b) FAO-IUU Plan of Action 
The second voluntary guideline in relation to fisheries management is the FAO-IUU Plan of 
Action. The discussion will be focused on the International Plan of Action for Fishing 
Capacity given its links to capacity control and subsidies in the fisheries negotiations.  It 
states that members should take measures to prevent or eliminate excess fishing capacity and 
should ensure that levels of fishing effort are commensurate with the sustainable use of 
fishery resources. In doing so, it provides for major strategies, which include conducting 
national, regional and global assessment of capacity and improvement of the capability for 
monitoring fishing capacity, the preparation and implementation of national plans to 
effectively manage fishing capacity and of immediate actions for coastal fisheries requiring 
urgent measures, the strengthening of regional fisheries organizations and related 
mechanisms and improved management of fishing capacity at regional and global levels. In 
developing of national plans and policies it further states that countries should develop, 
implement and monitor national plans of action for managing fishing capacity taking into 
account, inter alia, the effect of different resource management systems on fishing capacity. 
 
In developing the national plan, the Code of Conduct on Capacity underscores that States 
should give due consideration, in the development of national plans, to socio-economic 
requirements, including the consideration of alternative sources of employment and 
livelihood for fishing communities, which must bear the reductions in fishing capacity. The 
code further states that in instances where it is found that the national plan to manage 
capacity is not necessary, states should ensure that the matter of fishing capacity is addressed 
in an ongoing manner in fishery management. At a minimum, in at least four years, States 
should review the implementation of its national plans to manage capacity for the purpose of 
identifying cost effective strategies for increasing effectiveness. 
 
The Code also stipulates that States, when developing their national plans for the 
management of fishing capacity should assess the possible impact of all factors, including 
subsidies, contributing to overcapacity on the sustainable management of their fisheries, 
distinguished between factors including subsidies, which contribute to overcapacity and 
unsustainability and those which produce a positive effect or are neutral. The Code further 
emphasizes that States should reduce and progressively eliminate all factors, including 
subsidies and economic incentives and other factors which contribute directly or indirectly to 
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the build-up of excessive fishing capacity thereby undermining the sustainability of marine 
living resources, giving due regard to the needs of artisanal fisheries. In this connection, 
States should cooperate, where appropriate, through regional fisheries organizations or 
arrangements and other forms of cooperation, with a view to ensuring the effective 
management of fishing capacity. 
 
c) FAO Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Small Scale Fisheries 
 
The FAO Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Small Scale Fisheries recognizes the need for 
responsible and sustainable use of aquatic biodiversity and natural resources to meet the 
developmental and environmental requirements of the present and future generations. It 
focuses on small scale fisheries that need to have secure tenure rights to the resources that 
form the basis for their social and cultural well-being, their livelihood and sustainable 
development. It further encourages that all parties should provide support to small scale 
fishing communities. This support may be in the form of technical and financial assistance, 
exchanging and improving traditional knowledge of aquatic ecosystems.  The implementation 
of the voluntary guidelines should be supported by States through South-South Cooperation, 
technical cooperation, financial assistance, institutional capacity development, knowledge 
sharing and exchange of experiences, assistance in developing national small-scale fisheries 
policies and transfer of technology. 
 
d) FAO Port State Measures 
The FAO Port State Measures (PSMA) is another agreement that is related to management of 
fisheries and IUU. Not all members of the WTO are signatories of the PSMA. The objective 
of this agreement is to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing through the implementation 
of effective port state measures. It is only binding on members that are parties to the PSMA. 
In its application, the agreement states that a party may in its capacity as a port state not apply 
this agreement to vessels chartered by its nationals exclusively for fishing in areas under its 
national jurisdiction and operating under its authority.  The PSMA also recognized the 
sovereign rights of members over its jurisdiction. It states that “(n)nothing in the Agreement 
shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of parties under international law. In 
particular, nothing in this agreement shall be construed to affect: (a) the sovereignty of parties 
over their internal, archipelagic and territorial waters or their sovereign rights over their 
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continental shelf and in their exclusive economic zones; and the exercise by Parties of their 
sovereignty over ports in their territory in accordance with international law, including their 
right to deny entry thereto as well as to adopt more stringent port state measures than those 
provided for in this agreement, including such measures adopted pursuant to a decision of a 
regional fisheries management organization.” 
 
Article 21 of the PSMA fully recognizes the special requirements of developing states. It 
states that parties shall provide assistance to developing state parties in order to a) enhance 
their ability, in particular the least-developed among them and small island developing states, 
to develop a legal basis and capacity for implementation of effective port state measures, b) 
facilitate their participation in any international organizations that promote the effective 
development and implementation of port state measures; and c) facilitate technical assistance 
to strengthen the development and implementation of port state measures by them, in 
coordination with relevant international mechanisms. It further states that parties shall 
cooperate to establish appropriate funding mechanisms to assist developing states in the 
implementation of the agreement.  
 
It must be noted that the above are guidelines for member states to follow and are not legal 
instruments. Guidelines usually evolve with time and are not static. As per the EU’s proposal 
Special and Differential Treatment is conditioned to disciplines on fisheries management 
including the abovementioned guidelines. Developing countries need to be cautious of the 
EU’s proposal, which would translate the said non-binding guidelines into legally binding 
obligations under the WTO. Furthermore, some of the CMMs agreed to in various RFMOs, 
which are non-binding, are under discussion at the WTO fisheries negotiations, with the view 
to legally bind not just the members of the RFMOs but also other WTO members who are not 
part of the said RFMO. It clearly shows that implicitly the proponents of stringent fisheries 
management intend to discipline fisheries management as opposed to fisheries subsidies at 
the WTO. Further, in pursuance of this attempt they have imposed a disproportionate burden 
on developing states. This will be discussed infra in the paper. 
 
Section 2.5: Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) 
The ASCM is an agreement agreed to by the Members of the World Trade Organization that 
aims to discipline subsidies in non-agricultural products. The agreement provides set criteria 
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for the determination of subsidies and measures that Member States can take in the event of 
damage or injury incurred to its domestic industries due to subsidization. The agreement 
focuses on disciplines in relation to specific subsidies.  
Article 1.1 of the ASCM states that a subsidy is said to exist if (i) there is a financial 
contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a member, i.e. where 
(i) government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans and equity 
infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g loan guarantee); (ii) government 
revenue that is otherwise die is forgone and not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax 
credits); (iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure or 
purchase goods; (iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism , or entrusts or 
directs a private sector body to carry out one or more of the functions from (i) –(iii). 
 
Subsidies have been classified into three broad categories under the ASCM: 
A. Non-Actionable Subsidies – Subsidies which are non-specific and available to all 
industries, enterprises and regions within the jurisdiction of the granting authority. 
B. Prohibited Subsidies – Subsidies that are not allowed under the disciplines. For 
example subsidies related to exports, locational subsidies and capacity enhancing 
subsidies  
C. Actionable Subsidies - Subsidies that do not fall in the categories of non-actionable 
and prohibited subsidies. There are permissible yet actionable through countervailing 
measures. 
 
The discussions on the disciplines on fisheries subsidies in all the proposals make reference 
to the ASCM and target disciplines in relation to specific subsidies within the fisheries 
negotiations. 
 
Section 3: Mandates on Fisheries Negotiations 
Section 3 is an excursus on the development of disciplines on fisheries subsidies at the WTO. 
It is bifurcated into three subsections. Section 3.1 discusses the mandates on fisheries 
subsidies negotiated during the successive Ministerial Conferences of the WTO. Section 3.2 
stipulates other international developments that have spurred the prompt negotiation of 
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fisheries disciplines at the WTO. Finally, Section 3.3 analyses the proposals forwarded by 
States as the basis to negotiate fisheries disciplines at MC 11.  
Section 3.1: WTO Mandates 
In the context of the multilateral trading rules in the World Trade Organization, the issue of 
fisheries subsidies negotiation has been an ongoing debate since the Doha Mandate of 2001.  
a) Doha Mandate 
Annex D of the Doha Mandate on the Rules on Anti-Dumping and Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures including Fisheries Subsidies in Relation to Fisheries recalls the 
commitment at Doha on “enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment, 
noted that there is broad agreement that the Group should strengthen disciplines on subsidises 
in the fisheries sector, including through the prohibition of certain forms of fisheries subsidies 
that contribute to overcapacity and over fishing and Call on Participants to promptly 
undertake further detailed work, to inter alia, establish the nature and extent of those 
disciplines, including transparency and enforceability”.   
The Doha mandate in relation to fisheries also stated that “appropriate and effective Special 
and Differential Treatment for developing and least-developed members should be an integral 
part of the fisheries subsidies negotiations, taking into account the importance of this sector 
to development priorities, poverty reduction and livelihood and food security concerns”. 
b) Hong Kong Mandate 
The importance of fisheries negotiations was further augmented in the Hong Kong Mandate 
of the WTO. The mandate given by Ministers in Hong Kong was to strengthen the disciplines 
on subsidies that contribute to overcapacity, overfishing and the provision of appropriate and 
effective Special and Differential Treatment(S&DT) for developing countries. The mandate 
refers in detail to the S&D treatment issue, stating that “appropriate and effective” Special 
and Differential Treatment for developing and least-developed members should be an integral 
part of the fisheries subsidies negotiations, taking into account the importance of this sector 
to development priorities, poverty reduction, and livelihood and food security concerns. 
The Hong Kong Mandate reflects the reality of the challenge for developing countries. While 
requiring the prohibition of subsidies that negatively impact fisheries resources, the mandate 
recognizes that the fisheries sector is crucial for many developing countries, where the role of 
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fisheries subsidies cannot be excluded. As such subsidies disciplines and developmental 
aspirations are not contradictory and need to be reconciled to achieve meaningful results in 
the fisheries subsidies negotiations. 
c) Nairobi Ministerial Declaration 
In 2015, at the Nairobi Ministerial Meeting, the WTO Members had further aimed at reaching 
a conclusion on fisheries subsidies negotiations. However, due to divergences, an agreement 
could not be reached. On the sidelines, a group of 28 States had issued a Ministerial 
Statement on the importance of the fisheries sector. 
Since Nairobi, WTO members have tried to intensify negotiations on formulating disciplines 
on fisheries subsidies. Members are steadfast in achieving an outcome on fisheries subsidies 
negotiations in Buenos Aires in December 2017. Some members have premised the 
negotiations on specifics of the SDG 14.6 goals which further make reference to the 
prohibition of certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and 
overfishing; elimination of subsidies that contribute to Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
fishing and refraining for introducing new subsidies.   
Section 3.2: Mandates on fisheries subsidies outside the WTO  
a) SDG 14.6 Mandate 
SDG 14.6 in particular states that members are to prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies 
which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing and eliminate subsidies that contribute to 
IUU fishing and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate 
and effective Special and Differential Treatment for developing and least developed countries 
should be an integral part of the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiation. 
b) UN Call for Action on Oceans Conference and WTOs Role 
The Call for Action at the Oceans Conference in New York from 5-9 June 2017, also 
emphasised that members act decisively to prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which 
contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, 
including through accelerating work to complete negotiations at the World Trade 
Organization on this issue, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential 
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treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part of those 
negotiations.   
Section 3.3: Assessment of Proposals on Fisheries Subsidies Disciplines at the WTO 
The members of the WTO are discussing a compilation text on the Rules on fisheries 
subsidies. The consolidated text is a compilation of the 7 proposals by various proponents. In 
addition, a new proposal by China has been circulated to members in November, 2017. Table 
3, contains the list of proposals by members. 
Table 3: List of Fisheries Subsidies Proposal  
Proposals Document Number 
1. European Union TN/RL/GEN/181/Rev.1 
2. Indonesia TN/RL.GEN.189/Rev.1 
3. Norway TN/RL/GEN/191 
4. Argentina, Colombia, Peru Costa 
Rica, Panama, Uruguay (ACCPU) 
TN/Rl/GEN/187 
5. African Carribean Pacific TN/RL/GEN/192 
6. Least Developed Countries TN/RL/GEN/184 
7. New Zealand TN/RL/GEN/186 
8. China TN/RL/GEN/195 
Source: www.wto.org 
In the current negotiation on fisheries subsidies, the proponents focus on Articles 1 and 2 of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). Articles 1 and 2 of the 
ASCM provide for disciplines in relation to specific subsidies. Given that most developed 
countries (e.g EU) have shifted their specific subsidies to non-specific subsidies, the issue is 
whether in the outcomes of the fisheries subsidies negotiations, the developed countries 
would be making any substantial commitments. The EU provides 3.4 approximately billion 
euro of annual subsidies to its fisheries sector, nearly 1 billion euro comes from the EU 
budget notably in the form of structural aid. The national level aid, which is regulated at the 
EU level is estimated at 973 million euro per year. This is in addition to the foregone revenue 
resulting from fuel tax exemptions (approximately 1.5 billion euro per year).
18
 In addition, 
Table 4 provides a list of countries granting budgetary support to the fisheries marine capture. 
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 Reforming EU Fisheries Subsidies, 2011. 
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According to the OECD data Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the EU provide 
high levels of budgetary support (non-specific subsidies) to the fisheries marine capture. 
       Table 4: Fisheries Marine Capture Budgetary Estimates for 2015 
Unit US dollar 
Year 2015 
Australia  120,891,070 
Belgium  4,274,555 
Canada  655,422,543 
Czech Republic 235,805 
Denmark  59,459,302 
Estonia 6,023,009 
France  91,155,662 
Germany 34,298,168 
Greece  37,022,339 
Iceland  6,138,469 
Ireland  34,291,900 
Japan  1,196,601,137 
Netherlands  7,454,300 
New Zealand  47,483,044 
Norway 197,036,369 
Portugal  3,151,032 
Slovenia 849,382 
Spain  130,422,847 
Sweden  64,084,217 
United Kingdom  36,041,237 
United States 1,820,680,000 
(Source: OECD Database) 
It is also interesting to note that the developed countries like New Zealand, who are strongly 
advocating for the elimination of specific subsidies in fisheries were once providers of these 
subsidies. Two policy instruments that were used by New Zealand to encourage the 
expansion of their domestic fleets into the EEZ included (1) package of financial incentives 
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to domestic industry including duty free vessel importation, concessionary interest and 
suspensory loans, investment allowances and tax incentives and (2) Joint Ventures which 
enabled domestic fishing companies to acquire technology and expertise, gaining access to 
international markets and supplying on-shore processing facilities. The foreign partners 
contributed equity to joint venture, provided capital for plant and equipment and assisted with 
access to international markets. The companies in New Zealand could charter foreign vessels. 
The chartered vessels were used to provide the supply of raw materials necessary to establish 
on-shore processing and distribution facilities. It was also recognized that the industry’s rapid 
expansion was largely attributable to joint ventures. (Sharp, 1997, np).  
For the USA, in 1960s
19
 the US Government had also provided substantial specific subsidies 
to the fisheries sector. The US Government has transferred fishing equipment to the private 
sector, presumably at no cost. In addition, the US implemented the Fishing Vessel 
Construction Differential Subsidy Programme and other subsidy programmes were instituted 
to promote the expansion and modernization of the American fishing fleet. Starting in 1957, 
the Fisheries Loan Fund was used to encourage the expansion of the fishing fleet, through the 
refinancing of old debt or the creation of new debt for vessel construction. This programme, 
evolved into the Fishing Vessel Obligation Guarantee Programme and then the Fisheries 
Finance Programme. The Vessel Mortgage Insurance Programme was established in 1960 to 
provide insurance for mortgages taken to finance fishing vessel construction. 
In relation to the European Union, within the period of 2000-2006
20
, the EU has granted 
subsides of more than 480 million Euros for the construction of new vessels and more than 
227 million euros for increasing processing capacities amounting to 707 billion euros for 
expanding fishing fleet capacity. In addition, fuel tax exemption remains an additional 
subsidy provided by the EU. In relation to the subsidization by region, from 200-2008
21
, EU 
has given a total of 34.5 million to subsidize its Mediterranean Tuna Fishing Fleet. With 23 
million euros on construction of new boats and an additional 10.5 million euros given to 
modernise existing vessels where 1 million euros was used to decommission vessels. 
The proposal of New Zealand, Iceland and Pakistan, includes a standstill provision which 
ironically states that no member shall introduce new or extend or enhances existing, subsidies 
                                                          
19
 See <http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/Y4647E/y4647e06.htm>. 
20
 See <https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/docs/body/pro_wildlife_en.pdf>. 
21
 See <https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/docs/body/pro_wildlife_en.pdf>. 
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within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, to the extent they are specific 
within the meaning of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement, that contribute to overfishing or 
overcapacity.  While these prohibitions appear to be inspired by the Trans Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) text, it is a clear reflection of how developed economies are aiming to ensure that it 
retains the market dominance and the first mover advantage in the fisheries sector globally. 
Most developing countries including the least developed countries are in the early stages of 
their fisheries sector development and these economies are not major contributors to the 
problem of IUU, their growth of the fisheries sector is likely to be hampered by disciplines on  
specific fisheries subsidies. Table 5 provides examples of specific subsidies provided by the 
developing countries between 2003-2009. It is also interesting to note that the United States 
is also a major provider of specific subsidies to its fisheries sector as well. The disciplines on 
fisheries subsidies will therefore affect some of the developed countries while benefitting a 
selected few that have a commercial interest in the sector. 
Table 5: Illustrative List of Specific Subsidies provided by Developing Countries and 
USA 
Specific 
Subsidies 
 
USD 
(000) 
USD 
(000) USD (000) 
USD 
(000) 
 
Year China India Russia USA 
Boat 
construction, 
renewal and 
modernization 
2003 24200 
1646
88 
100000 7567 
 
2009 6259 4035 148971 17720 
Fishery 
development and 
support services 
2003 125 
2648
9 
0 20297 
 
2009 28549 3751 0 14552 
Fishing port 
construction and 
renovation 
2003 64625 
1212
59 
280000 0 
 
2009 1232 4062 350069 0 
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Marketing 
support and 
storage 
infrastructure 
2003 100 
2221
9 
0 28285 
 
2009 119 4035 159261 216732 
Tax exemption 2003 
[1267
81] 
284 [29385] 29431 
 
2009 
16639
9 
1239
57 
0 91313 
 
2009 
23528
2 
0 88615 13439 
Fuel subsidies 2003 
18140
00 
2217
10 
491000 52061 
 
2009 
  
1032504 242690 
 
2009 
   
85296 
Rural fisheries 
community 
development 
2003 
19120
3 
   
 
2009 2905 
          Source: www.seaaroundus.org 
A reduction of such specific subsidies will curtail the development of their fisheries sector. 
This will result in others exiting the market. If any balance in the fisheries negotiation 
outcomes in subsidies is to be achieved then developed countries should take major 
commitments toward eliminating or reducing their non-specific subsidies and vessel capacity. 
The United States has expressed its interest to include inland fisheries as part of the fisheries 
subsidies disciplines. USA is not a major exporter of inland fisheries. Table 6 below shows 
the list of the major players for inland fisheries. These include New Zealand, the EU, 
Argentina, Korea and Japan. An inference in relation to market access would be that the 
disciplines for inland,  level playing field would be created should such disciplines target the 
major providers of inland fisheries subsidies In other words, it may allow for greater market 
entry of  other players in the inland fisheries, including the USA.  
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 Table 6: Inland Fisheries Exports in Local Currency by Countries 
Measure National Currency 
Species GRAND TOTAL 
Year 2012 2013 2014 
Country Unit       
Denmark 
Danish 
Krone 
2,054,427 2,031,519 2,199,005 
New 
Zealand  
New 
Zealand 
Dollar 
3,527,297 3,530,845 3,040,182 
Estonia Euro 5,164,258 4,640,643 4,706,715 
Sweden 
Swedish 
Krona 
102,927,827 79,003,686 82,666,838 
Argentina  
Argentine 
Peso 
80,616,900 100,109,330 164,080,948 
Finland Euro 10,530,000 .. .. 
Germany Euro 22,702,680 .. .. 
Greece Euro .. .. .. 
Hungary Forint 1,073,754,980 .. .. 
Iceland  
Iceland 
Krona 
29,600,000 .. .. 
Japan Yen 18,022,000,000 16,944,000,000 .. 
Korea  Won 70,188,087,000 50,511,023,000 .. 
                     Source: OECD  database 
In relation to overcapacity, the developed countries have a greater fleet capacity in relation to 
the number of vessels and the gross tonnage. Table 7 shows the ratio of fleet capacity in 
tonnes per vessel for countries. For  EU, New Zealand and Argentina the  ratio of gross 
tonnage per number of vessel are significant.. 
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Table 7: Fleet Capacity Gross Tonnes per Vessel by Country 
Measure Gross tonnage (GT) 
Number of Vessels 
(NV) 
GT/NV 
Fleet Total Vessels Total Vessels in tonnes 
Unit Tonnes Number   
Year 2013 2014 2013 2014 2014 
Country          GT /NV 
European Union  .. 1,725,938 .. 87,445 19.74 
Norway 381,146 392,468 6,126 5,939 66.08 
Spain 372,617 379,209 9,872 9,895 38.32 
United Kingdom  198,560 198,598 6,481 6,415 30.96 
France  166,561 177,860 7,158 7,143 24.9 
Argentina  179,806 167,646 902 911 184.02 
Italy 163,892 163,788 12,691 12,675 12.92 
Netherlands 148,934 150,097 904 864 173.72 
New Zealand 122,111 119,620 1,367 1,334 89.67 
Greece  78,103 76,866 15,860 15,883 4.84 
Denmark  65,271 69,138 2,632 2,455 28.16 
Ireland 63,795 64,251 2,164 2,202 29.18 
Germany 61,061 61,794 1,530 1,538 40.18 
Australia  35,713 40,741 306 309 132 
Poland 33,949 33,729 899 832 40.54 
Finland 16,524 16,467 3,219 3,210 5.13 
Belgium  14,645 14,985 80 82 182.74 
Korea 607,224 .. 71,287 ..   
Japan .. .. 253,017 ..   
Canada  .. .. 18,452 ..   
Source: OECD Database and authors own calculation 
The developed countries have the capacity to fish and with reduction and or elimination of 
subsidies in global fisheries trade, the developed countries will once again enjoy greater 
policy space while the developing countries will pay a higher price. This is similar to the 
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situation of the agricultural fisheries subsides. The latter is an issue which the developing 
countries are still trying to reverse to date.  
There have been discussions on the need to combat IUU and thus the elimination of subsidies 
being the reason. It is obvious fact that no country whether developed or developing favour 
IUU and it is a problem that requires a solution. However, to deal with responsible fisheries 
WTO can only discuss this from a trade perspective with actual solutions that do not 
undermine development.   
In some of the proposals (EU and Indonesia), the Special and Differential Treatment for 
developing countries are linked to conditions on fisheries management. In the EU proposal in 
order for developing countries to develop their fishing capacity,  the vessel benefitting from 
the subsidy should  not target fish stocks that are in an overfished condition; the targeted 
stocks are managed on the basis of the best available science at the disposal of the concerned 
member, consistent with the conservation and cooperation obligations under the relevant 
international law, as reflected in UNCLOS, conservation and management measures of 
competent RFMOS, and generally accepted standards for conservation and management of 
fisheries resources and the subsidizing member has a management plan for the fleet segment 
it intends to subsidise. Furthermore, the EU defines the management plan in a footnote of its 
text and also aims to legally bind the guidelines and generally accepted standards which 
otherwise only reference documents such as the FAO Code of Conduct. These are 
management conditions that are in fact aimed to deter the development of the fisheries sector 
for the developing countries.  
As highlighted earlier in this paper, the management of fisheries resources is complex. There 
are respective RFMOs that are specialised to discuss issues in relation to management 
measures including undertaking fish stock assessment.  In the context of the WTO 
negotiations these issues should be left to the RFMO. The proposal submitted by China 
recognizes the role of the RFMO. On the other hand from the EU and the Indonesian 
proposal and to some extent the New Zealand proposal on transparency, the provision 
requires members to notify CMM and catch data by species which are all linked to 
management measures. These are measures that are discussed in the RFMOs. Refer to Tables 
1 and 2 on the list of CMMs. 
Members need to be cautious as there is an explicit and implicit attempt to push  resolutions 
from the RFMOs in the WTO fisheries subsidies text. In other words, the WTO is sought to 
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be used as a as a forum to implement fisheries management measures, mainly prevailing in 
RFMOs. As discussed earlier, in many of the RFMOs for example the WCPFC and the 
IOTC, CMMs are negotiated and agreed by member states. As such WTO is further sought to 
be used as a forum by the developed countries to obtain the negotiating leverage on 
management issues on which they may not be able to obtain a consensus in the RFMOs. In 
the context of the RFMOs, the conservation and management measures are negotiated 
decisions. In the RFMO forum the developed and developing countries negotiate CMMs 
taking into account the special requirements of the developing countries. In the event where 
EU and the developed countries may not be able to negotiate and achieve the required 
outcomes of a CMM in the RFMOs, they will utilize the WTO dispute settlement to 
challenge the measure and impose on the developing countries. 
For example, on the issue of transhipment at sea, at the WCPFC, regulation 2009-06 states 
that the measures shall not apply to transhipment of highly migratory fish stocks where fish is 
taken and transhipped wholly in archipelagic or territorial seas. Transhipments in ports or in 
waters under national jurisdictions of a member shall take place in accordance with 
appropriate national laws. Furthermore the IOTC Resolution 17/06 states that a program to 
monitor transhipment at sea applies only to a large scale tuna long line fishing vessel. In the 
WTO, transhipment issues are also covered in the fisheries text including extending it to 
small scale fishing activities.   
Another example is the CMM 2009-10 of the WCPFC. It provides for the monitoring the 
landing of purse seine vessels at ports so as to ensure reliable catch data by species. The 
CMM further states that such information will be collected from the canneries and shall be 
handled in “non-public domain” i.e. kept confidential. Catch data is important to determine 
the commercial interest of competitors as well. For the EU, ACCPU and New Zealand, the 
provision of such data in the public domain through WTO transparency mechanisms is a 
means for them to provide access to such data for their industries to have competitive 
advantage in catch as well. The IOTC Resolution 15/02 provides the caveat for mandatory 
statistical reporting requirements for IOTC contracting and non-contracting parties. The 
members are required to provide data on total catch by species and gear (catch and effort data 
only) for surface fishers, long line fishers and coastal fishers.  
In the 9
th
 Regular Session of the WCPFC in 2012 a resolution was agreed by members on 
“best available science”. In the EU proposal in the WTO, the members are discussing the 
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issue of “best available science” within the context of the fisheries subsidies negotiation, 
although this is an issue for the RFMOs. 
This highlights (1) the strategy of the developed countries to bring the management issue, 
which is well placed in the RFMOs, into the WTO and impose it on all members and (2) the 
issue of “cherry picking” certain decisions of the RFMO to have it implemented legally in 
another forum.  Should members plan on using RFMO resolutions in the WTO fisheries 
subsidies, the appropriate resolution would be the “Resolution on the Reduction of 
Overcapacity” of the WCPFC agreed on 12 December 2005. The resolution calls for 
developed countries to reduce overcapacity by a certain period of time. The developing 
countries must therefore exercise caution in the fisheries subsidies negotiations 
In relation to Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IUU), most of the proposal have 
made a direct reference to FAO Code of Conduct on IUU with exception to the ACP proposal 
that has an Annex listing and also refers to the national legislations. One must be cognizant 
that the FAO Code of Conduct on IUU is a guideline which may evolve in future. As such a 
direct importation of the guidelines may lock further space for discussions should situations 
evolve? Secondly, members should also be provided the option to be guided by their national 
laws and regulation. The FAO Code of Conduct and most Members’ legislation separates the 
definition of I, U, U. This is a practical means of resolving and reaching some level of 
convergence. In the proposal from China and the ACP it moves away from this position of 
explicitly referencing the Code itself. Both proposals provide room for determination as per 
the national legislation and thus retaining policy space. The Chinese proposal on IUU in its 
determination further references the RFMOs procedures which are consistent given that many 
RFMOs have set guidelines and procedures for listing and delisting vessels. For example the 
WCPFC CMM measure 2010-06 and the IOTC Resolution 17/03 both provide for definition 
of IUU, vessel listing and delisting procedures and the required information to be submitted 
by parties concerned.  
It is obvious that no member country would deliberately allow for illegal fishing. In order to 
combat IUU in relation to management these need to be discussed outside the WTO in the 
relevant forums. As highlighted earlier, member countries collaborate at the national, sub-
regional and regional level with Monitoring, Control and Surveillance and penalties.  
Another important consideration in relation to IUU that needs to be examined is the need to 
provide technical and financial resources to the developing countries to improve their 
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regulation and reporting. This could be through legislative changes, having observers on the 
boat or GPS systems etc. on the boats. This should therefore be part of the Special and 
Differential Treatment. Some members are debating the possibility of providing a transitional 
period for countries to adapt to measures of responsible fishing. Time period is one aspect 
that is appreciated; however, the technical and financial assistance to implement effective and 
responsible fisheries measures is even more critical.  
Members need to be cautious about the acceptance of unilateral IUU measures that may be 
used by some as a disguised restriction to favour their own fishing vessels over others, should 
such liberty be provided. The EU proposal also makes a reference to generally accepted 
standards. At present the EU and the United States impose unilateral measures in relation to 
IUU. The EU applies trade related measures to combat IUU in the form of yellow card 
(identification of non-cooperating countries) and a ban on imports from the particular 
country. These are applied broadly to all fish and all fleet of a particular country regardless of 
the IUU fishing that triggered the identification, which means it is more likely to have a 
disproportionate impact on small-scale fisheries. The US IUU trade related measures are 
designed to target only fleet, species and product type directly tied to IUU that has given rise 
to the identification. As such the EU system is more opaque then the US system. (Hosch G, 
2016)). It is therefore imperative for members to ensure that while developing the disciplines 
of fisheries subsidies, unilateral measures such as that of the EU are not multilateralized. As 
such these measures should not be used as a disguised restriction to trade while setting 
disciplines on fisheries subsidies. 
On the issue of IUU and the maritime boundaries, the ACP proposal is the one that should be 
favoured as it carves out the EEZ. There cannot be a presumption that within the EEZ the 
Member States are committing IUU or encouraging such practices. Member States are the 
owners of their EEZ and have their national and sub-regional collaboration and management 
measures in place to combat IUU. This again is an issue of management that should be 
discussed in the relevant forums outside the WTO. Under the UNCLOS, coastal states have a 
sovereign right over their EEZ and have the obligation to manage the resources. Members 
need to be cognizant of their legally binding rights under the UNCLOS in relation to their 
EEZ and these rights must not be compromised or diluted. The Agreements Establishing the 
RFMOs and the resolutions passed by the RFMOs, for example the resolutions of the 
WCPFC and the IOTC, recognize the sovereign right of a coastal state over its EEZ in 
managing its fish resources. Another strategy that is clear in the fisheries negotiations is that 
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the developed countries are aiming to limit the sovereign rights of Member States in their 
EEZs. 
On the issue of transparency, the proposals of New Zealand, Pakistan and Iceland, require 
members to submit information which is beyond the existing notification requirements under 
the ASCM. The highly ambitious transparency obligations proposed by New Zealand, 
Pakistan and Iceland are mirrored in the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. The 
proposal of the ACCPU also has a similar expanded list, which is not favourable to the 
developing countries.  
Given that the discussions are on fisheries subsidies, the transparency obligations should be 
in accordance with Article 25.3 of the ASCM. The latter requires information pertaining to 
the form of subsidy, the subsidy per unit, or in case where this is not possible, the total 
amount or the annual amount budgeted for that subsidy (indicating, if possible, the average 
subsidy per unit in the previous year), the policy objectives and or purpose of a subsidy, 
duration of a subsidy and/or any other time-limits attached to it and statistical data permitting 
an assessment of the trade effects of a subsidy. Furthermore, footnote 34 of the ASCM also 
recognizes that nothing in this notification provision requires the provision of confidential 
information, including confidential business information. 
New Zealand, Iceland and Pakistan’s proposal on transparency goes beyond the ASCM. The 
additional information required is part of fisheries management. Information related to 
management should be discussed in the RFMO. This includes the information related to 
“vessel and operators fishing in areas beyond national jurisdiction for which subsidy is 
granted”, “the catch data by species”, “the fleet capacity in the fishery”, “the status of the 
stock for which the subsidy is granted, “the conservation and management measures in place 
for the relevant fish stock” and the EU’s inclusion of a “fishing capacity management plan.” 
The transparency obligation requires data on the export and import per species. The data may 
also be used by member countries for commercial interests. As such as per the ASCM, a 
qualifier has to be included in the text to ensure that the privacy laws of the Member States 
are respected and that commercially confidential information is not subjected to the 
disciplines.  
The broad basis of Special and Differential Treatment should not only provide differentiated 
timelines for developed and developing countries but must include additional flexibilities to 
ensure the development of the fisheries sector. As per the WT/COMTD/W/196, there is a six- 
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fold typology to Special and Differential Treatment. This includes the provisions aimed at 
increasing trade opportunities to developing country members, provisions under which WTO 
members should safeguard the interests of developing country member, flexibility of 
commitments of action, and use of policy instruments, transitional time-period, technical 
assistance and provisions in relation to LDC members. 
The SDT sought to be incorporated in the WTO fisheries disciplines, is also an integral 
element in other binding and non-binding agreements as discussed in Section I. These are 
called “Special Requirements of Developing Countries”. In the RFMOs, members recognize 
SDT with the term of “disproportionate burden”. In several RFMO resolutions on 
development of measures, the Special and Differential Treatment of developing countries is 
taken into account. The WCPFC Resolution on the special requirements of developing 
countries lists a number of areas for technical and financial assistance for developing 
countries in relation to fisheries. These also extend to enhanced market access for fish and 
fish products from the developed countries. 
Some of the fisheries texts that are currently under discussion have accommodated different 
levels of SDT. However, some are more burdensome linking it to management. As a result it 
is futile in terms of its operationalization. The EU SDT is stringent and links conditions to 
management practises and plans of countries. The attempt of the EU is to discipline fisheries 
management within the WTO.  The Indonesian proposal on SDT also follows a similar path. 
Such stringent conditions would make it impossible for small economies with limited 
resources to develop their fisheries sector. Through such stringent linkages, the EU and 
Indonesian proposals are aiming to limit the entry of fishers from countries into their fisheries 
sector. As discussed previously, there are relevant international organizations that deal with 
management measures more effectively and the WTO is not the appropriate forum to this 
effect. This reflects a pure market deterrent strategy by the proponents. 
The ACP proposal of SDT has a pro-development agenda for the fisheries sector, mindful of 
the special needs of the developing and least developed countries. The ACP proposal 
provides for transition periods for the implementation of the reporting and regulatory 
obligations. In tandem with this, the LDC proposal recognizes the rights of developing 
countries under the UNCLOS and therefore allows for developing countries to grant and 
maintain subsidies for (i) fishing activities related exclusively to artisanal and small scale 
fisheries or the subsistence and livelihood of the fishermen and their families. It also allows 
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for the granting and maintaining of subsidies for fishing activities which exclusively exploit 
fish stock within the EEZ of the Member granting the subsidy; and for fishing activities, 
which exclusively exploit quotas or any other rights, established by an RFMO or a regional 
fisheries management arrangement. In relation to the RFMO quotas and its exclusion, the 
ACP proposal is similarly aligned with the LDC proposal.  
The ACP proposal also carves out small scale commercial fishing. The ACP has further 
enhanced the SDT on account of the capacity constraints of developing countries and LDCs. 
It requires the developed countries, developing countries in a position to do so and relevant 
agencies, to provide targeted technical assistance and capacity building to developing 
countries, in particular LDCs and small, vulnerable economies (SVEs). SDT is further 
provided in the form of establishing reporting mechanisms and regulations to prevent 
unreported and unregulated fishing, conducting stock assessment and assistance to provide 
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance of stock as well as assistance in research and 
development. 
The pro-development stance of the ACP proposal is strengthened by the inclusion that the 
operationalization of disciplines on fisheries subsidies should not impede the ability of 
developing countries and LDCs to develop and diversify their fisheries sector. This is a 
critical element in the text to avoid the notion of IUU measures being used as a disguised 
restriction to trade in light of the unilateral IUU measures implemented by developed 
countries.  It also seeks to avoid repeating those mistakes in fisheries subsidies negotiations, 
which resulted in asymmetries and imbalances in the Agreement on Agriculture. 
Section 4: Fisheries Policies; Subsidies and Market Access 
Section 4.1 is devoted to assessing the two kinds of fisheries policies, namely the open access 
and the limited entry policy. The following subsection examines whether the momentum to 
discipline fisheries subsidies is in fact a market access issue and not a sustainability concern.  
Section 4.1: Fisheries Policy 
a) Open Access Policy 
Another critical element of the disciplines on fisheries subsidies is the Open Access and 
Limited Entry Policies in the fisheries sector. Kahn (2015), explained the difference between 
‘open access’ and ‘limited entry techniques’ in fisheries policy extensively. The Open-Access 
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Regulations modify the fishing behaviour of the participants in the fishery without directly 
affecting their participation. The Open Access regulations typically raise the cost of fishing. 
However, they may indirectly affect the participation in the fishery by causing the marginal 
fisher to become unprofitable and leave the fishery. It is designed to maintain fish stocks at 
some target level. Fish stocks consistent with maximum sustainable yield were often the 
theoretical target of fishery management although often management schemes were not put 
into place until stocks had shrunk well below the level consistent with the maximum 
sustainable yield. Open access regulations generally take the form of restrictions on how fish 
may be caught, which fish may be caught, where fish may be caught and how many fish may 
be caught.  
The primary effect of open-access regulations is to raise the cost of catching fish. If 
individual fishers are already operating in the most cost effective manner, any restriction of 
their activity must raise the cost of catching fish.  On the other hand, these regulations 
generally increase the size of the fish population, and consequently lower the cost. The 
increase in cost generated by such regulations has the impact of eliminating the rent in the 
fishery at a lower level of fishing effort than would occur without the restriction. In other 
words, the increase in cost created by these restrictions make it less profitable to be involved 
in fishing, because the restrictions increase the resources required to catch a given amount of 
fish. 
 At the same time, the increase in fish populations associated with the regulations and 
reduced level of effort serve to reduce the cost of catching a given amount of fish. The net 
effect of the regulations, however, will be to increase the cost of fishing. Finally, the impact 
of the regulations on the catch of fish must be examined. If the current fish population is 
greater than the population associated with the maximum sustainable yield, then the 
restriction will serve to reduce catch. However, if the fishery is highly exploited and the 
current fish population is lower level associated with the maximum sustainable yield, then the 
restriction will increase the catch.  Thus, open access fishing raises the cost of protecting the 
fish stock. As a result it exacerbates the problem by devoting too many resources to the 
fishery an imposing additional inefficiencies. 
b) Limited Entry Policy 
The Limited Entry Technique (LET) policy is similar to the open access policy in the sense 
that it increases the costs for the fishers. For example taxes and other types of incentives may 
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raise the cost of fishers but they do so in a manner that the extra cost represents a transfer 
within the society rather than a loss of resources.  
In relation to fisheries a limit is imposed on the total catch and each fisher in the fishery is 
allocated a portion of this total catch. The initial allocation can be conducted through several 
means, for example by auction, lottery or based on previous catch data. This allocation is 
with the individual fishers quota and he or she can sell all or part of the quota. The level of 
effort is limited because the cost of effort increases as people must now buy the quotas to 
fish. Note that this increase in cost has occurred without increasing the amount of resources 
needed to catch the fish. This cost increase serves to eliminate the disparity between the 
social and private cost of fishing associated with the open-access externality. 
The limited entry technique can also be structured relative to effort instead of catch. For 
example, the fishery management could decide that only a fixed number of boats would be 
allowed in the fishery. In other words, this is a means to control the capacity of boats that 
enter into a fishery. (Kahn, 2015,np) 
Table 8: Impact of Open Access and Limited Entry Technique in Fisheries 
Variables Open Access LET 
Cost of Fishers Increase Increase 
Resources used in 
Fishing 
Increase Decrease 
Population of Fish Increase Increase 
Catch of Fish Increase/Decrease Increase/Decrease 
Consumer/Producer 
Surplus 
Increase/Decrease Increase/Decrease 
(Source: Kahn, 2015,np) 
Section 4.2: Fisheries Subsidies disciplines as a Market Access Issue 
In the current fisheries negotiations at the WTO, the members are working towards 
developing a set of rules to discipline fisheries subsidies. The developed country members 
have shown a strong concern on the depletion of the fisheries resources and thus are 
advocating sustainability of the resources at the WTO. On the other hand, the membership at 
the WTO shares the common view that sustainability of the fisheries resources is critical to 
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the food security and livelihood of the developing and least developed countries. However, 
there are also concerns with respect to the economic growth and development of the fisheries 
sector in relation to the disciplines on fisheries subsidies. These concerns of the developing 
countries are also enshrined in the existing fisheries instruments under the “special 
requirements of developing countries”.  
Grynberg 2003 further reveals the motives of the developed countries in the fisheries 
subsidies negotiation. “In the case of the fisheries, proponents are a mixed collection of 
countries with commercial interest and those which believe that fisheries subsidies disciplines 
will constitute an important step towards environmental sustainability. With the friends of 
fish group, substantial and clearly demonstrable commercial interest is at stake for Iceland 
and New Zealand. Both the nations have a highly efficient and competitive fishing fleet but 
neither carry significant bargaining power. Iceland fisheries constitutes 75% of export 
earnings and hence the government simply cannot compete with other WTO members on 
subsidies i.e., the Icelandic economy cannot subsidise. In the case of New Zealand, which has 
pursued a policy of aggressive unilateral liberalization, there is no opposition to such 
subsidies.  
In other words New Zealand and Iceland will both benefit from the exit of other players, 
which are currently subsidising from the fisheries market. The EU has reduced its subsidies 
over time and has achieved the required level of fleet capacity. It is therefore advocating for 
an even stronger position in relation to the elimination of subsidies, as it will also benefit 
from less players in the fisheries market.  The issue of sustainability is used as a disguise for 
enhancing market access in the sector. If the EU and the other so called friends of fish were 
genuinely interested in fish stock depletion, fisheries would have been a component of the 
disciplines on Agreement on Agriculture. However “during the Uruguay round, political 
opposition to the inclusion of fisheries under the reduction on Agreement on Agriculture 
came from the EU and countries called the “friends of fish”. (Grynberg, 2003,505).   
The application of the disciplines on fisheries subsidies is therefore an application of the LET 
fisheries policy that will provide a competitive advantage and increase the market share of the 
developed countries such as the EU, Iceland and New Zealand.  If caution is not exercised in 
the fisheries negotiations, the resultant disciplines would mirror the loss of policy space of 
the developing countries and asymmetric outcomes as seen in the context of the agriculture 
negotiations in the Uruguay Round. 
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The developed countries held high levels of agricultural support during the Uruguay round 
agreement in 1994. Even though ceilings on some type of subsidies were applied under the 
agreement, most of the developed countries have retained the high level of support through 
“box shifting” i.e. moving most of their subsidies into the “Green Box” under which  
unlimited subsidies can be provided. Even though the Green Box entitlements are available to 
the developing countries, however, due to resource constraints (fiscal budgetary restraints), 
they are unable to utilize them fully. As a result, imbalances exist in the context of agriculture 
to date. 
Under the WTO negotiations, the existing proposals on the table from the European Union, 
New Zealand, Pakistan and Iceland and Latin America focus on disciplines on fisheries 
subsidies in relation to specific subsidies as opposed to horizontal subsidies.  This is a 
replication of the agriculture subsidies negotiations. According to the OECD database on 
subsidies, the EU member countries have progressively, over the years, moved their specific 
subsidies into budgetary support. The EU provides approximately 3.4 billion of annual 
subsidies to the EU fisheries sector, nearly 1 billion of which is from the EU budget in the 
form of structural aid. At the national level aid is estimated at 975 million and this is in 
addition to the lost revenue resulting from fuel tax exemptions. Few EU fleets are profitable 
with no public support. (Reforming EU Subsidies, 2011, np). For small economies the 
fisheries sector is unorganized and small, thus government support is required. Developed 
countries have managed shift to non-specific fisheries subsidies from specific subsidies. As a 
result, under the current disciplines on fisheries negotiations, the developed countries will not 
be making any major substantial commitments. On the other hand, the developing countries 
which still provide specific subsidies would be “caught in the net” i.e. required to discipline 
subsidies by 2020, which is a span of three years. For countries such as the EU, it took more 
than 20 years to undertake their fisheries sector reforms.  
At present there are several world marine producers in the fisheries market. Table 9 shows 
that the major worlds marine catch producers are China (17.7%), Indonesia (6.54%), Peru 
(6.28%), USA (5.6%), EU-28 (5.17%), India (4.92%), Russia (4.65%), Myanmar (4.05%), 
Japan (4%), Vietnam (3%), Philippines (2.5%), Chile (2.45%), Norway (2.38%), Thailand 
(1.97%) and the rest of the world (28.75%). The data clearly shows the market share in 
fisheries from the top 14 countries. Out of these 9 economies are developing countries. The 
major competing developed countries are USA, Japan and Norway.  
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Table 9: Total Catch of Worlds Marine Catch Producers 
Country 
Marine Catch (Volume in 
tonnes) 
Marine Catch (%) 
China 16557949 17.7 
Indonesia 6120137 6.54 
Peru 5876322 6.28 
USA 5242379 5.6 
EU-28 481560 5.17 
India 4645182 4.92 
Russia 4351209 4.65 
Myanmar 3786840 4.05 
Japan 3741959 4 
Vietnam 2803800 3 
Philippines 2335404 2.5 
Chile 2288874 2.45 
Norway 2228513 2.38 
Thailand 1843747 1.97 
Others 26899394 28.75 
 
(Source: EC Facts and Figures in Common Fisheries Policy, 2016). 
The removal of subsidies will translate into some of the dominant players exiting the fisheries 
market. As previously mentioned, given that the EU and the “friends of the fish” have shifted 
most of their specific subsidies to non-specific categories, the removal of specific subsidies 
by others will benefit the developed countries. It will boost their competitive edge in the 
global fisheries market. 
The disciplines on fisheries subsidies will act as a deterrent to the entry of vessel owners from 
developing countries, to access the fisheries resources. For small developing coastal states the 
fisheries activities include (i) revenue generation from access fees from distant water fleets, 
(ii) domestic and foreign fishers operating for export in the EEZ and territorial sea to supply 
canneries, loining facilities and domestic processing facility and (iii) artisanal fishers within 
the territorial sea for domestic and export markets. Further, in the fisheries sector many small 
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vulnerable coastal states governments have been attempting to localise the distant water 
fisheries as well as developing linkages between inshore fishing in the territorial sea and 
other sectors of their economies, which includes tourism. (Grynberg, 2003, 504). 
As a result, the disciplines on fisheries subsidies will impede the development of the fisheries 
sector for small coastal states within the large EEZ. For low income poor resource fishers, the 
disciplines on subsidies will increase their cost of operations. Most of the fishing vessels for 
low income resource poor fishers are traditional and not motorised. These low income 
resource poor fishers will further be marginalised due to elimination of subsidies. It will 
prevent the small fishers from engaging in economical fisheries activities for their livelihood 
and food security purposes. 
The Government would not be in a position to assist the small commercial fisheries sector to 
fully utilize its own fisheries resources - even though under the UNCLOS coastal States have 
the right to manage and exploit the fisheries resources within their EEZ. Independent of the 
disciplines on fisheries subsidies, coastal states apply management measures as per the 
national legislation in their territorial waters and in co-operation with sub-regional fisheries 
organizations in their EEZ. 
Even in the event that small scale fishers are carved out from the application on fisheries 
subsidies disciplines, the scale and magnitude of small scale fisheries differ from that of a 
developed country. As a result, the small scale fisheries of small coastal States will be 
marginalised and market access of fisheries captured by developed countries will remain 
unaffected.  
Consequently, the inability of the coastal States to utilise their own fisheries resources will 
translate into a greater share of the fish stock resources being available for the distant water 
fishing nations (DWFN). The DWFNs who will remain efficient in the market will be the EU 
and the countries composed of the “friends of fish”. This group of countries (including EU, 
Iceland and New Zealand) have already shifted most of their specific subsidies to non-
specific category. Initially with other players in the fish access market including the 
developing countries, there would be competition to bid for the access rights. However, if 
subsidies are eliminated and should most of the developing countries exit the fisheries 
market, these few developed countries will remain as dominant players and will bid for fish 
access rights. The developed countries will have greater bargaining power to determine the 
price of the access rights.  
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In other words, the elimination of fisheries subsidies will  accord to the developed nations 
(EU and the Friends of Fish) a greater share of the existing fish quota rights of fish. given that 
the elimination of fisheries subsidies will drive the developing countries out of the market. 
On the demand side of fishing access rights, due to the reduction of specific subsidies in 
forms of fuels, vessel modernization and other related subsidies, the developing nations that 
were once competitors may be compelled to move out of the market, and those that may 
aspire to enter the commercial fishing sector may never be able to reach that level. This 
reduction in the market demand for fish access rights would lead to a surplus supply of fish 
access rights.  
The ultimate result will be that a few distant water fishing nations that have already 
developed their fishing vessels and have shifted most of their specific subsidies to non-
specific category for example the EU and New Zealand, (prior to the negotiations on 
disciplines on fisheries subsidies) will dominate the demand side of fishing access rights. 
Developed countries such as the United States may also be affected by the fisheries 
disciplines due to their inability to provide specific subsidies. The few developing distant 
water fishing nations including the EU would therefore be pure profit maximisers and gain 
economic rent would be created in their favour. The bargaining power of small coastal States 
would decline and the few Distant Water Fishing Nations would dictate the price at which the 
access rights would be purchased. This would create a monopoly or oligopoly over access 
rights and lead to market domination by developed countries. 
Section 5: Implications of WTO Negotiations: Asymmetric Outcomes 
Based on the assessments from Sections 2 and 4, the present section will discuss the 
implications of the WTO subsidies negotiations and the asymmetrical outcomes for 
developing countries. 
Section 5.1: Developing Countries decapitated to utilize its fisheries resources 
The developed and developing countries including the least developed economies are at 
different levels of development and subsidisation. As highlighted in the previous sections, the 
developed countries such as the EU and the “friends of fish” are advocating for the 
elimination of fisheries subsidies that they had themselves provided in the past in order to 
boost their fisheries sector.  
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A situation prevails where the developed countries are now in a position to dominate the 
global fisheries market, after building their fishing capacity on the basis of generous subsidies 
from the government. . The elimination of fisheries subsidies will decapitate the developing 
countries from utilizing their own fisheries resources. Several strategies have been applied by 
the proponents such as linking the special and differential treatment to stringent management 
measures which are burdensome for small states to achieve.  With the cost of implementation 
outweighing the benefits, it is obvious that the small states would never be able to utilize their 
own fisheries resources. Secondly, the standstill provision proposed by New Zealand, aims to 
undermine the policy space for developing countries to develop its fisheries sector. The 
developing and least developed countries rely on fisheries for food security and livelihood. 
Further, some coastal states aim to domesticate their fisheries industry. However, the 
elimination of subsidies will derail such aspirations. In addition, if developing countries are 
prohibited from providing subsidies for capacity enhancement, then they are unlikely to 
develop fishing fleets to exploit their own marine resources in future. 
Section 5.2: Shift in Bargaining Power towards few Developed countries DWFN for fish 
access rights. 
The fisheries sector constitutes a demand and supply equation for fisheries access rights. The 
developing countries including the coastal States and LDCs are the holders of fish resources. 
The coastal States with their maritime boundaries, own a major share of the fish resources 
extending up to their EEZ. Under UNCLOS, these coastal states have the right to manage and 
exploit the resources within their EEZ. In doing so, the coastal States also have rights over 
the fisheries resources within their EEZ and will determine its management measures as well. 
As discussed in the previous section, the coastal States cooperate at the national and sub-
regional level with various institutions to manage their fisheries resources. For highly 
migratory and straddling stock such as tuna and cooperation in the high seas, the coastal 
States are members of RFMOs and negotiate management measures to sustainably manage 
the resource.   
 
Consequently, the coastal States are the owners of the fish resource and thus the holders of 
fish access rights. Most of the developed countries such as EU and the “friends of fish” are 
owners of fishing vessels. In order for these countries to fish in the EEZ of other countries, 
they have to bid for access rights i.e. buy rights to fish from the coastal states. Currently, 
there are several distant water fishing nations that compete for access rights, including China, 
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Japan, Korea, Thailand, EU and others. As a result the small coastal States that are holders of 
fish resources, have the opportunity to sell the access fishing rights of its EEZ to the highest 
bidder i.e. whoever provides the best price for the fisheries resources will get the right to fish.  
The developing countries therefore have some bargaining power. The coastal States also 
ensure that while providing the fishing rights, the right holder also adheres to the 
conservation and management measures in place. Even when the highest bidder gets the 
resources, fishing happens in a sustainable manner. 
 
With the elimination of fisheries subsidies, the developing countries that possess fishing 
vessels and provide specific subsidies may be compelled to exit the market over time due to 
the high operating costs. However, the developed countries that are vessel owners and have 
undertaken fisheries reforms (and have a commercial interest), will remain. There will be few 
demanders of fish access rights in the market i.e. the EU and the “friends of fish”.  The 
coastal states and other developing countries would not be able to develop their fisheries 
sector, given the constraints of disciplining fishery subsidies.  
 
As a result, the developed countries with large fishing fleets will dictate the price of the 
fishery access rights to the small coastal states and thus there will be a shift in the bargaining 
power for fish access rights in the hands of a few developed countries. The developed 
countries can then dictate the price of the access rights, i.e. purchase the rights to fish at a 
lower price; thereby, monopolizing the entire fisheries market. 
 
Section 5.3: Stifling the Future Development of Commercial Fisheries Sector  
The global trend in the fisheries sector currently shows that the developing countries’ export 
of fish and fish products exceeds that of the developed countries. The developing countries 
include coastal States that are owners of large fish resources within their EEZs and also 
providers of specific subsidies. Furthermore, the small vulnerable coastal states also envisage 
development of their fisheries sector and some would want to venture into commercial 
fisheries. Given that these countries are already members of RFMOs and sub-regional 
arrangements, their resources will be utilised in a sustainable manner. However, the provision 
of subsidies will be integral to ensure the development of their fisheries sector. The 
imposition of disciplines, such as the elimination of fisheries subsidies and stringent 
conditions to provide the subsidies will affect the development aspiration of these countries. 
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This would stifle the future commercial fisheries sector development in the developing 
countries.  
Section 5.4: Binding decisions of different RFMOs in relation to Management and 
imposing it multilaterally on members 
At the global level, countries are committed to conserving and sustainably managing the 
fisheries resources. This is evident from the commitments and membership of countries to the 
UNCLOS, the UN Fish Stocks agreement and the participation of countries in the RFMOs, 
sub-regional fisheries management and at the national level. In order to ensure that fish 
resources are sustainably managed, the coastal states, the Distant Water Fishing Nations and 
Cooperating Non-Members negotiate conservation and management measures. There are 
several management measures negotiated as highlighted in Table 1 and 2 as examples in the 
WCPFC and the IOTC. These management measures are negotiated, taking into account the 
conservation of resources and also the socio-economic conditions that prevail within the 
region. As such, the element of disproportionate burden is crucial in the negotiations.  
In the current fisheries negotiations at the WTO, members that are linking management to the 
fisheries disciplines are using the WTO as a forum to impose the management measures 
under a legally binding framework on all the members and in the context of the WTO these 
measures do not take into account the full extent of the disproportionate burden on 
developing countries, in particular the least developed countries. Secondly some of the 
management measures imposed in the RFMOs are for the high seas jurisdiction. However in 
the context of the WTO, some proponents have extended these to territorial waters and EEZ. 
For example, on the issue of transhipment at sea, the WCPFC regulation 2009-06 states that 
the measures shall not apply to transhipment of highly migratory fish stocks where fish is 
taken and transhipped wholly in archipelagic or territorial seas. Transhipments in ports or in 
waters under the national jurisdiction of a member shall take place in accordance with 
appropriate national laws. Furthermore the IOTC Resolution 17/06 states that a program to 
monitor transhipment at sea applies only to a large scale tuna long line fishing vessel. In the 
WTO, transhipment issues are also covered in the fisheries text including extending it to 
small scale fishing activities.   
Another illustration is that of the issue of enhanced transparency that proponents such as the 
EU, ACCPU and New Zealand have been advocating. The proponents are demanding 
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information such as catch data by species, the status of fish stock, the kinds of conservation 
and management measures applied and the fish capacity management plan.  
The request for catch data by species is purely a management issue. The CMM 2009-10 of 
the WCPFC provides for the monitoring of landing of purse seine vessels at ports so as to 
ensure reliable catch data by the species. The CMM further states that such information will 
be collected from the canneries and shall be handled in the “non-public domain” i.e. kept 
confidential. Catch data is important to determine the commercial interest of the competitors 
as well. For the EU, ACCPU and New Zealand, the provision of such data in the public 
domain through WTO transparency mechanisms is a means for them to provide access to 
such data for their industries to have a competitive advantage. The IOTC Resolution 15/02 
also provides the caveat for mandatory statistical reporting requirements for the IOTC 
contracting and non-contracting parties. The members are to provide data on total catch by 
species and gear (catch and effort data only) for surface fishers, long line fishers and coastal 
fishers.  
The issue of flag of convenience in the proposal from Indonesia is also an issue from the 
IOTC RFMO. It is linked to management measures. The Resolution 99/02 provides that the 
CP and the CNP shall take every possible action consistent with their relevant laws and (i) 
urge their importers, transporters and other concerned business people to refrain from 
transacting in and transshipping tunas and tuna-like species caught by vessels carrying out 
FOC fishing activities; (ii) to inform their general public of FOC fishing activity by tuna long 
line vessels which diminish the effectiveness of IOTC CMM and urge them not to purchase 
fish harvested by such vessels; and (iii) to urge their fish manufacturers and other concerned 
business people to prevent their vessels and equipment/devices from being used for FOC 
long-line fishing operators. 
 
The developed countries have been selective in imposing management measures from the 
RFMOs which (i) have been agreed through negotiations within the RFMOS by members 
states. It is obvious that given that these proponents may not have achieved the negotiated 
outcomes in the relevant RFMOs, such measures are sought to be introduced into the WTO 
forum and to exacerbate it further, if caution is not exercised will be imposed on all WTO 
members under a legal framework. 
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However the proponents EU, New Zealand, Iceland and others that have linked management 
aspects under different provisions and shadowed it with the explanation of development, have 
in effect ignored other fundamental aspect of the CMM that are development driven. A few 
examples of requirements under the CMMs that are missing from WTO negotiations are 
provided below: 
 IOTC Resolution 03/01 on the Limitation of Fishing Capacity of Contracting Parties 
and Cooperating non-Contracting Parties states that the parties which have more than 
50 vessels on the 2003 IOTC record of vessel shall limit in 2004 and following years 
the number of fishing vessels larger than 24 meters in length. The limitation number 
shall commensurate with the corresponding overall tonnage expressed in Gross 
Registered tonnage and where vessels are replaced the over tonnage shall not be 
exceeded. 
 The WCPC resolution 2013-06 on the criteria for developing CMMs states that the 
CMMs must not result in transferring directly or indirectly a disproportionate burden 
of conservation action on small states. As such new proposals on CMMs have to be 
assessed against set criteria. In cases where transfer of disproportionate burden of 
conservation is present, this needs to be mitigated by phased or delayed 
implementation, exemption from specific obligations, proportional or rotational 
implementation and the establishment of compensatory funds. 
 The WCPFC resolution of 2013-07 on Special Requirements of Small Island 
Developing States provides for a list of areas for assistance that must be provided to 
developing countries for implementation. These include capacity development 
training, institutional support, technical training on data collection, scientific research, 
stock assessment, by catches mitigation, fisheries science and administration. The 
CMM further states that assistance should also be provided for monitoring control and 
surveillance, technology transfer, support for domestic fisheries sector including 
ensuring SIDS and territories to account for 50% of total catch and value of highly 
migratory fish stocks by encouraging investment and collaborative arrangement. It 
further states the actions should not constrain coastal processing and use of 
transshipment facilities and associated vessels of SIDS to undermine legitimate 
investment in SIDS. The CCMs shall take action to eliminate barriers to trade in fish 
and fisheries products and promote activities of domestic fisheries sector and fisheries 
related businesses in SIDS and territories. 
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From the above, the strategy of the developed countries is virtually clear in that in the WTO it 
aims to (i) selectively bind the conservation and management measures of the different 
RFMO, that are serves its own commercial interest and (ii) modify some of the RFMOs 
CMM decisions that were negotiated among members in the RFMO and further expand their 
own interest in the process to achieve the outcomes they prefers and (iii) ignore the full 
development aspect in relation to developing countries even in the development of 
management measures in the RFMOs i.e. the element of disproportionate burden and special 
requirements of developing countries as a special and differential element in the WTO. 
Section 5.6: Undermining Development Provisions (SDT) in the Fisheries Subsidies 
Negotiations 
 
The special and differential treatment provisions are integral in the fisheries subsidies 
negotiations. The current proposals in the fisheries negotiations focus mainly on the transition 
period for the implementation of the subsidies reform by members. Some proposals have also 
adopted a format similar to that of the trade facilitation agreement on declaring the capacity 
constraints and assistance needed to implement the fisheries disciplines. However, it should 
be noted that fisheries subsidies disciplines differ from trade facilitation and thus the latter 
approach may not be feasible. According to WT/COMTD/W/196, there is a six- fold 
typology to the special and differential treatment. These include (i) provisions aimed at 
increasing trade opportunities to developing country members, (ii) provisions under which 
WTO members should safeguard the interests of developing country member, (iii) flexibility 
of commitments of action, (iv) the use of policy instruments (v) transitional time-period and 
(vi) technical assistance and provision in relation to LDC members. 
 
The fisheries proposal has limited the scope of the special and differential treatment to only 
selected time periods for implementation with the exception of the ACP proposal that has 
listed additional types of assistance. Through the WTO process of fisheries negotiations 
which is a legally binding agreement, the developed countries further aim to reduce the 
special and differential aspect of fisheries and at the same time expand on other 
commitments. The principle of special and differential treatment is embedded in other 
internationally legally binding instruments in relation to fisheries such as the UNCLOS and 
UN Fish Stock Agreement. Other non-legally binding agreements also have the recognised 
special and differential treatment (known as Special Requirements of Developing Countries). 
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The UN Fish Stocks Agreement for instance recognizes (i) the vulnerability of developing 
states which are dependent on the exploitation of living marine resources, (ii) the need to 
avoid adverse impact and ensure access to fisheries by subsistent, small scale and artisanal 
fisheries and (iii) the need to ensure that such measures do not result in transferring directly 
or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action upon developing states. 
 
The fisheries proposal from the developed countries are either overriding or reducing the 
scope of the special and differential treatment. In the EU proposal for example, the SDT is 
conditioned on the implementation of fisheries management measures. The Indonesian 
proposal also has a similar language. It completely ignores the special and differential 
treatment provisions that members are entitled to under international agreements and 
disregards the aspect of “disproportionate burden”. The WTO process is selective in relation 
to the six-fold approach and only stipulates transition period as an accepted SDT practice. 
The Indonesian proposal recognizes special and differential treatment but with stringent 
measures that the assistance has to be mutually agreed by developed and developing 
countries. This defeats the purpose of assistance and also undermines the special 
requirements of developing countries which the members are obliged to provide without 
reason or negotiation should there be issue of disproportionality in international fisheries 
agreement. As a result, the special and differential treatment is undermined. 
 
Section 5.7: Strategy to shift market dominance of fisheries into the hands of few 
developed countries- tuna related products too 
Globally the demand for fish and fish products is projected to grow in 2022. The global 
fishmeal & fish oil market is projected to reach a value of USD 14.28 billion by 2022. The 
market is driven by factors such as growing trend in fishmeal & fish oil trade and the 
increasing global demand for quality fish. Moreover, the demand for aquaculture is increasing 
in export markets, which influences the supply of improved fishmeal & fish oil for animal 
production. On the basis of industrial application, fishmeal & fish oil were most widely 
consumed in 2016 in the pharmaceuticals industry. 
According to the FAO 2016 State of the World Fisheries report, the share of the world fish 
production that is used for human consumption has risen substantially from 67% in the 1960s 
up to 87%. About 146 million tonnes of the fish are used for human consumption. The 
reminder 21 million tonnes are used for non-food products of which 76% was used in 2014 
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for fishmeal and fish-oil. The rest were largely used for numerous purposes including raw 
material for direct feeding in aquaculture. As such the by-product of the fisheries is also 
becoming an important industry.  
The report further states that fish and fishery products represent the most traded segment of 
the world food sector and 78% of seafood products are estimated to be part of the 
international trade competition. In terms of the market share of fisheries trade, the developing 
countries world fisheries trade rose from 37% in 1976 to 54% of total fishery export value by 
2014. The trade in fish and fishery product is primarily driven by the demand from developed 
countries, which dominate the fisheries import covering a share of 73% of the world imports. 
In the developed countries there is high dependence on imports to meet the demand for 
domestic consumption of fish. (FAO State of World Fisheries, 2016, 58) 
As a result, the removal of fish subsidies would constrain the developing countries from 
developing their fisheries sector due to the inability of the small-scale fisheries to expand into 
commercial fisheries. Secondly, those developing countries that may be in a position to 
export fisheries product and are still in the competitive fishing industry, may exit the market 
once fisheries subsidies are eliminated. The only remaining players in the global fisheries 
industry would be the developed countries that have large fishing fleet with high gross 
tonnage. These will primarily include the EU and the “friends of the fish” group of countries 
including New Zealand and Iceland that will dominate the fisheries market. As a result the 
fisheries resources would be in the hands of a few developed countries who would control the 
entire fisheries market. Those countries such as India that are major players in the 
pharmaceutical industry for generic medication will also be affected. The second effect will 
be that these industries will also control the global value chain. The likely outcome will be 
that the developed countries will become the producers and manufacturers of fish and fish 
related products as well as global exporters, holding a major share of the global fish market. 
In other words, a reversal of the current state of global fish exports, the developed countries 
becoming the dominating players. 
Section 5.8: Replicating Box Shifting Effects of Agreement on Agriculture in Fisheries 
Subsidies Negotiations 
The fisheries subsidies negotiations and the prohibition of subsidies is a replication of the 
strategy employed by the developed countries for agricultural subsidies. The issue of 
agricultural subsidy is an ongoing debate in the WTO. The developed countries provided high 
56 
 
levels of agriculture support during the Uruguay round agreement in 1994. Even though 
restrictions were applied under the agreement, most of the developed countries have retained 
the high level of support through “box shifting” i.e. moving most of its limited subsidies into 
the “Green Box” of subsidies. Even though the Green Box entitlements are available to the 
developing countries, however, due to resource constraints (fiscal budgetary restraints), they 
are unable to fully utilise these. 
 As a result, the imbalances exist to date in agriculture. Most of the developing countries are 
providing specific subsidies whereas the developed countries such as the EU and the friends 
of fish have shifted their fisheries subsidies towards non-specific subsidies. Negotiations on 
fisheries subsidies risk meeting a similar fate, whereby the developed countries may enjoy 
greater policy space in comparison to the developing and least developed countries. Under 
the current subsidies negotiations members are targeting disciplines as per Article 1 of the 
ASCM which targets specific subsidies. Accordingly, the developing countries will be the 
ones making substantial commitment while the developed countries will gain greater policy 
space and a competitive edge.  
 
Section 6: Conclusions 
The negotiation of fisheries disciplines at the WTO is a complex proposition. Despite the 
momentum by negotiators to reach an agreement in December at the MC 11 many issues 
need to be successfully resolved. As discussed above, the proponents have projected the 
disciplines on fisheries subsidies as a sustainability concern. However, a closer examination 
reveals the concern for market access as a more prominent driver.  
Fish is a major trading commodity that is in high demand.  Furthermore, one of the bi-
products of fish is used to produce fish oil which is a source of omega-3 for human 
consumption. The global fishmeal & fish oil market is projected to reach a value of USD 
14.28 billion by 2022.The market is driven by factors such as growing trade in fishmeal & 
fish oil as well as the increasing global demand for quality fish. Moreover, the demand for 
aquaculture is increasing in export markets, which influences the supply of improved 
fishmeal & fish oil for animal production. On the basis of industrial application, fishmeal & 
fish oil were most widely consumed in 2016 in the pharmaceutical industry. Fish oil is used 
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in the pharmaceutical industry in the form of omega-3 fatty acids; while fishmeal is used in 
the production of antibiotics. 
Binding rules on fisheries management have been enunciated under the UNCLOS and the 
UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Further, non-binding obligations on fisheries management are 
entailed under the FAO Code of Conduct. These are in fact complex issues and therefore at 
the regional, sub-regional and national levels the relevant management organizations 
collaborate in ensuring that fish resources are managed sustainably. Given that fish unlike 
land resource involves the issuance of fisheries access rights, as such there is a sea of 
competition to access the resources at a reasonable price. The countries with a large fleet 
capacity would eventually be the ones bidding for the access rights to fish in the EEZ of 
developing countries. 
The disciplines on fisheries subsidies should therefore ensure that stringent conditions are not 
imposed on developing countries so as to deter their ability to develop their fisheries sector 
and enter the fisheries market. Some of the smaller developing countries are aspiring to enter 
the market and thus need to be provided with an equal opportunity. Historically, countries for 
example the EU and New Zealand have been providing specific subsidies to develop their 
fleets.  However, these countries have shifted the specific subsidies into non-specific 
budgetary support. Should there be disciplines on specific subsidies alone, there would be an 
imbalance created once again and greater policy space will be accorded to developed 
countries. The negotiators need to learn lessons from subsidies disciplines in the agriculture 
sector. 
Secondly, entangling issues of management at the WTO is complicated and countries need to 
be vigilant as IUU measures should not be a disguised restriction to international trade. 
Fisheries mechanisms are in place at the regional and national level in order to enable 
countries to address IUU fishing in a concerted manner. If States wish to strengthen the 
regime on fisheries management, they must negotiate the same in a forum outside the 
purview of the WTO.  
In order to achieve an outcome on fisheries subsidies at the WTO, the focus must remain on 
the trade element. Considering that countries are at different levels of development and 
subsidization, there can be no one size fits all approach to disciplining fisheries subsidies. 
Those countries that are yet to develop their fisheries sector need to be provided with an 
effective and implementable Special and Differential Treatment. Transition period alone is 
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insufficient for these economies to develop the sector. Credence must be placed on the ACP 
proposal that expands the areas of technical and financial assistance to developing and least 
developed countries. 
Another critical factor that the negotiators need to be vigilant about is to ensure that their 
rights and obligations under international fisheries treaties (UNCLOS and UN fish stock 
agreement) are retained. In addition, though the FAO guidelines on fisheries management are 
an important benchmark, they are nonetheless not a legally binding text. As a result, countries 
must ensure that such guidelines are used as a reference but not incorporated into the fisheries 
disciplines as a legal text. The decision to grant a legally binding status to the guidelines on 
fisheries management would require negotiation in the relevant forums outside of the WTO, 
which would have the skills and expertise to do so. Secondly, developing countries have a 
certain degree of flexibility in implementing these guidelines based on their level of 
development and their domestic policy objective choices. Imposing these guidelines in a 
legally binding form at the WTO would have repercussions for the development of the 
domestic fisheries sector of developing countries. 
For any successful outcomes in fisheries negotiations, the focus should be on S&DT, which 
needs to be delinked from the complex issue of fisheries management.  
Given the global imbalance in the fisheries sector between the developed and developing 
nations, Special and Differential Treatment is of vital significance. The disciplines on 
fisheries subsidies have a market access agenda and a clear commercial interest of selected 
developed countries. Therefore, developing countries need to ensure that the history of the 
imbalance suffered from the disciplines on agriculture subsidies during the Uruguay round is 
not repeated in fisheries subsidies. 
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